The “pain point” of payments in the developed world

paymentsVitalik Buterin is one of the smartest writers and developers in the digital currency space. At the ripe age of 20 he has put together a repertoire of code, articles and most importantly challenges that the “cryptocurrency” world faces.

He recently penned an article that argues what Bitcoin needs today is usage by employers, not just more merchants.  That one of the ways to subdue and mitigate the high levels of volatility is for employers to pay employees in the digital currency whereupon employees then can pay for wares from existing merchants whom in turn pay their employees in bitcoin.

This sounds nice in theory — a fully enclosed system — but there are a number of problems with it, namely that in practice bitcoin is treated as a commodity or collectible (not a currency) by market participants and its deflationary allocation + inelastic money supply makes it a poor modern medium of exchange.

This point is argued in a recent paper by Ferdinando Ametrano:

The unfeasibility of a bitcoin loan is similar to that of a bitcoin salary: neither a borrower nor an employer would want to face the risk of seeing their debt or salary liabilities grow hundredfold in few years. A manufacturing firm cannot accept an order in bitcoin with the risk of its value doubling or halving on a single bad day. Even the development of a derivative market could only hedge these risks with an implausibly high price. This is the cryptocurrency paradox: arguably the best ever kind of money by any metrics, marred by the severe inability to serve as reliable unit of account.

Perhaps this will change over time, maybe one solution is through hard forks involving “growthcoin” (as proposed by Robert Sams) and “stablecoin” (as proposed by Ametrano).

However, one of the challenges will always be the “pain point” — what incentive do people have to switch to a competing platform in the first place?  Why should consumers or employers want to adopt bitcoin the currency?  For instance, most users in the developed world do not have to deal with double-spending or rampant inflation.  Credit card fraud rates represent roughly just 7 bps and some cards provide other types of incentive like cash-back rewards or frequent flier miles — something that bitcoin cards (if they existed) would have a uphill task of providing.  Similarly many modern savings accounts provide some form of interest rate plus deposit insurance — trying to on-board these types of users would be difficult because there is no current equivalent with Bitcoin (yet).  [Note: savings is different than speculative hoarding, see discussions here and possibly here.]

Two days ago Ben Edelman explained how in most circumstances, customers pay more just to use bitcoin yet without gaining any additional benefits.  By “use” he means using it for actual commerce and not holding on to it for speculative purposes.  Because of this friction, because bitcoin users typically need to spend more than the alternative forms of payment, despite the large increase in adoption by merchants over the past 6 months there has been very little corresponding transactional volume.  Instead it is being treated as a novelty, a speculative collectible.

Or as a friend of mine, Bob, calls it a “My Little Pony” toy.  In a nutshell Bob compares the bitcoin currency system with the My Little Pony collectible.  Bob has a daughter and according to her each Pony has its own story in its own little special universe filled with cartoons, video games, clothes and toys and that’s how bitcoin the currency is treated: many early bitcoin adopters enjoy the ever grander mythos and backstory, that it was created by an anonymous developer, the ledger entry cannot be double-spent, its distribution and promotion involves volunteers organically threaded together via Meet-ups and bulletin boards and is purportedly impervious to political whims.  This brings it to life in a more colorful way that other systems like Square or Stripe have not similarly created (see Seth Godin’s Purple Cow).  And according to Bob, My Little Pony characters can also have plight-filled adventures, though none involving subpoenas (yet).  See also: Bitcoin: a Money-like Informational Commodity

Perhaps Buterin’s solution will gather momentum over the coming years, however unless the average consumer needs to spend less (not more) to gain the same level of advantages and protections that current platforms have, it is unlikely that a snowball effect in payments will take place anytime soon.  Incidentally, one crowdfunded innovation that could likely move beyond “toy” phase soon is the Trezor hardware wallet because it fulfills a real pain point today, horribad security issues with protecting private keys.

The advantages and challenges of mining bitcoins in China

I received some feedback from a veteran of the mining subindustry in China regarding my previous research on this space.

According to him there are a number of other moving pieces at play that are fluid will not necessarily last.

For instance, providers such as HashRatio have succeeded, not by designing their own chip but by figuring out the best combination of system and power configurations.  Going from chip to working system is non-trivial.   The end result are systems which are not necessarily pretty to look at, but they work.

One of the issues this new source had with my report was that because of guanxi is relatively hard to quantify, knowing whether or not you have the best price of a particular resource (like energy) is always a lingering question.  That is to say, even if Alice knows the boss of a coal mine, another competitor, Bob, may know his bosses boss which gives Bob even cheaper rates than what you thought you were receiving.  Improving guanxi is a millennia old Herculean task.

Some other highlights according to the source:

  •        If Alice’s metric is purely dollars per ghash, the analysis was correct. This is because there are two important figures: Alice’s new ASIC kWh/hash multiplied by her electricity cost / kWh.
  •        While Moses Lake is quoted in many news reports at being 1.7 cents per kWh, there are many other parts of the state which are very low, some averaging 2.3 cents per kWh.  And Washington has a much better infrastructure (both for electricity and internet) than China which makes it a very competitive geographic region.
  •        Similarly, Russia is 1 to 1.2 cents per kWh, though, you would be in Russia.
  •        China is cheap relative to a lot of countries, but relative to Washington and Russia the community capacity is still limited by State Grid, a large state owned enterprise (SOE) with a flat rate of 0.3 RMB kWh buying in any power station linked to it.  Miners will likely be unable to go under that.
  •        While Alice can do some meter fiddling or go off grid power, those options are hard to find and probably will not last long.
  •        State Grid has likely heard of bitcoin mining, but the wattage usage is not big enough to pique their interest or oversight.
  •        Inner Mongolia, as part of China, has overinvested in wind farms.  Yet there are large areas that are not linked to the grid yet.  And due to the unstable nature of wind, as well as poor internet infrastructure, none of the mining pools has gone there yet.  And it is sparsely populated which leads to potential difficulties in sourcing human capital and talent to run a pool.
  •        Mongolia, the country, imports roughly 10-20% of its electricity from Russia, so Bob might as well go to Russia if he is willing to set up a facility in Mongolia.

Questions related to mining rewards in Bitcoin

A user, Bob, on Bitcoin Talk sent me some question in response to my article:

1) why does one assume transaction fees will substitute decreasing block rewards. are users not equivalent in choosing the operating software in the Bitcoin network why not just charge a mandatory 0.01% charge on all coins that are younger than X blocks and limit free transactions to say 30%. When the thermodynamic limit is achieved economic friction in Bitcoin will be just 0.01% of all energy consumed in the the economy.

2)the thermodynamic limit is not a limit in that there is entropy, the waste heat just becomes an input for a new system, eg. water can be desalinated, cooling as we know it today is a wasteful activity.

3) I also don’t seem to understand why when ASIC chips reach the thermodynamic limit they’ve wouldn’t start decentralizing in location (not ownership). There will always be centralized mining where energy is cheep but there will always be a need for heating at the very least everywhere and that is potentially a free energy input.

The free market is the perfect motivation for innovations not explored in your analysis.  Still you leave me in awe as to how alts are going to evolve as the energy equilibrium evolves.

My responses to Bob are the following:

1) In practice, users of the Bitcoin network do not like including transaction fees and there are endless threads on Bitcoin Talk of people complaining about fees.  In fact, one of the purported — wildly incorrect — selling points with Bitcoin is that it is somehow “free.”  Obviously this is incorrect, utilizing scarce resources is not free.  Someone has to pay.  The people who pay in this case are all bitcoin holders as roughly every 8-10 minutes new bitcoins are minted, diluting the shares of everyone through inflation.

But let us assume that we fast forward 100 years into the future when there are no longer block rewards, that miners will continue providing labor solely for transaction fees.  If these fees are floated and chosen by miners, it is impossible to say a priori what the actual market clearing fee will be.  Will it be 0.1%, 1%, 10%?  Or something in between?

One issue in Bob’s scenario is the “30% free transactions” — this is completely arbitrary.  Miners still have to bear a real cost to transacting and securing the network and only do so today because of block rewards.  If there are no block rewards and they want to continue providing “free” transactions, then they will be doing so out of charity which is not a sustainable business model.

2) The thermodynamic limit is something Andrew Poelstra has written about.  For the purposes of Bob’s specific point, Poelstra’s document can be ignored for the moment because it is still necessary to actually describe what is happening today.  If a bitcoin is worth $1,000, then an economically rational miner will only spend (capital costs + operating costs + taxes, etc.) no more than $1,000 to extract rents on that token.

In practice this is not the case as there are numerous examples of people and companies operating at losses for a variety of reasons, primarily because of price expectations: they believe that the token will eventually appreciate in value and the market value of the token will eventually cover their operating losses.  Thus today, the network is being “oversecured.”

As far as “waste,” that is how Proof-of-work works.  Someone, somewhere has to “burn” (or dissipate) something in order to secure the network.  Irrespective of what part of the supply chain or logistical operations it takes place, market participants are provided signals by token value (e.g. a $1,000 bitcoin) to turn off or on their hashing systems.  It doesn’t matter what the energy source is or how efficient ASICs are, market participants will simply use a calculator to find out if their inputs (capital costs + operating costs, taxes, etc.) allow them to profitably provide their labor.  The same goes for a $1 million bitcoin.

3) Let’s assume that tomorrow several chip manufacturers announced that they were now shipping chips with fabrication node spacing that reaches the Planck limit (see this interesting paper).  That essentially, irrespective of who you bought from, their hardware design was the most maximum efficient chip possible.  We will call this the Alice design.  What would happen in this case is that whoever was able to get a hold of Alice first would profit from it disproportionally at first (as other competing farms were using older less efficient designs).  But over the months, the distribution of Alice became widespread and you could go to a store and buy Alice off the shelf from a neighborhood retailer.

What would happen then is, since everyone is competing with the same hardware, the only variables to profitability would be land costs (plus taxes and compliance costs in your jurisdiction) and operating costs (electricity).  As a consequence, there would be global arbitrage, a dance in which miners would gravitate towards the cheapest region of the globe with favorable tax policies and cheapest electricity prices.

We already observe this happening today, which are discussed in that article.

The benefits that heating may play could be a factor, but if history of cloud computing is any guide, it is relatively unimportant — Google does not put employee housing within the middle of its data center to warm them with a Carnot engine of some kind (yet).  But again, this is unimportant.  All mining facilities, just like any data center, will have a profitability calculator.  Irrespective of how they displace or use the energy they have a bottom line of whether or not they can continue providing the service (via their computational labor) at a profitable rate.

Also, in practice, data centers typically receive subsidies from a variety of sources (like local tax breaks).  Even if you removed all of the subsidies and all geographical regions were “pure free markets” — there are still areas on the planet with better infrastructure, cheaper energy resources, better property rights, etc.  Those are the same locations capital moves to on a yearly basis.

Future Opportunites and Economic Challenges for Cryptoledgers

On March 27, 2014 I gave a presentation at the Institute for the Future in Palo Alto.

I covered a number of topics including some of the governance challenges surrounding the protocol, the tragedy of the commons surrounding the development of the system as well as how the network pays for itself through token dilution (seigniorage).

This is based on the following research paper:

  • Bitcoin Hurdles: the Public Goods Costs of Securing a Decentralized Seigniorage Network which Incentivizes Alternatives and Centralization (pdf)

I made at least one error in the presentation.  Regarding microtransactions, this was not specifically stated in the original 2008 white paper but was subsequently discussed by adopters as an area for potential opportunities.  Here is one thread at StackExchange that discusses this further.

Currently only off-chain solutions like Coinbase support the ability to transact at the satoshi level.

[Note: this presentation was made prior to the announcement of “Sidechains” which is a Blockchain 2.0 company that could ameliorate some of the governance issues]

Proof-of-Gox and Recoverycoins

Yesterday I had the pleasure to moderate a panel discussing Goxcoin on LTB episode #89.  Participants included Adam B. Levine who is the editor-in-chief of Let’s Talk Bitcoin! as well the chief visionary officer to the Humint project (and who wrote the foreword to GCON).  David Johnston is the managing director of BitAngels, the first angel investment network focused on digital-currency startups, and a board member at the Mastercoin Foundation (I also interviewed him for GCON and included his insights in Chapter 3).  And the final panelist was Pete Earle, who is a multi-decade veteran of the financial trading sector as well as an economics writer (the article that sticks out most to me was incidentally his piece on mudflation).

It’s a very thought provoking conversation as it raises real-world use-cases for using cryptoprotocols (such as Bitcoin and Mastercoin) in a more effective, efficient, secure and transparent manner than existing models and frameworks.

Developers can find out more information about the Master protocol white paper.

Presentation covering Smart Contracts, Smart Property and Trustless Asset Management

Earlier tonight I gave a presentation at Hacker Dojo with the Ethereum project.  I would like to thank Chris Peel and Joel Dietz for organizing it.  Below is a video and accompanying slide deck.  In addition to the footnotes in the PPT, I recommend looking at the wiki on smart contracts and Nick Szabo’s writings (1 2 3).

Also, some quotes regarding synthetic assets in Szabos’ work:

Citation 1:  “Another area that might be considered in smart contract terms is synthetic assets[5]. These new securities are formed by combining securities (such as bonds) and derivatives (options and futures) in a wide variety of ways.”

Citation 2: “Creating synthetic assets or combinations that mimic the financial functionality of some other contract while avoiding its legal limitations”

Citation 3: “Reference to Perry H. Beaumont, Fixed Income Synthetic Assets”

Casual conversation with Mastercoin, Ethereum and Invictus (Bitshares/Protoshares)

A week ago, Let’s Talk Bitcoin sat down with three developers Charles Hoskinson (Ethereum), David Johnston (Mastercoin) and Daniel Larimer (Invictus/Bitshares).  Well worth your time as it covers all the hot topics in this space today: smart contract, smart property, DAX (decentralized autonomous corporation/organization/application/etc.).  Lot’s of great quotes, insights and vision.

Interview covering China, smart contracts and trustless asset management

Earlier today I was interviewed by Donald McIntyre at Newfination.  We discussed a number of topics related to cryptocurrencies and trustless asset management including smart contracts and how they can be applied in China (see video below).

My current motivation and interest stems from the lack of clear property rights and contracts in China.  While some jurisdictions are better than others (like Shanghai), no one actually owns property for more than 70 years whereupon it is automatically reverted back to the state.1  In many cases, the actual property may only have a 40 or 50 year lease left because of the different staggered stages of post-Mao liberalization.

Furthermore, at any given time these titles can be revoked or modified by a 3rd party without recourse.  As a consequence, land confiscation is very common and is actually the leading cause for social unrest.  For example, each year approximately 4 million rural Chinese are evicted from their land.2 Why?  Because, according to an HSBC report, local governments generate 70% of their income from land sales much of which are ill-gotten gains for one ore more party (e.g., state owned firms have local leaders evict farmers from land).3  And there is no property tax, not because China is some hyper libertarian utopia but because corrupt officials — some of the same ones that confiscated the land — do not want to reveal their property holdings.

Potential cryptocurrency-related solutions

In 2004 a report from the OECD found that roughly half of all urban Chinese workers, primarily migrant workers from the provinces participated in the informal sector (this is between 120-150 million people).4 Could they benefit if their payroll and compensation was managed by a Decentralized Autonomous Corporation rather than a human laoban (boss) who could change their mind or otherwise abuse the relationship (e.g., change the contract ex post)?  For instance, without an urban hukou (household registration) most of these migrant workers are left without any legal recourse in the event that their contracts are tampered or ignored.

‘Trustless asset management’ tools built on top of a cryptoledger such as Bitcoin or Ethereum (which are tamper-evident) could empower not just those in the developed world, but also those in the developing world who are more easily marginalized without political guanxi.  Even if trustless asset management networks are not deemed legitimate or valid by the government or a Party apparatus, the goals of several decentralized smart contract based systems being developed could level the playing field and allow individuals from all walks of life to actually codify and manage scarce goods that they currently own.

While books and volumes could be written on this topic, one view is that even if there are stricter capital controls and regulations on cryptocurrencies in China (or elsewhere), that by using a couple different ‘colored’ coin chains (or Ethereum contracts, etc.) Bob from Beijing could still transfer assets worth X amount of money to Anhui Alice instead of X amount of money itself.  This according to the promoters, could create a sort of advanced barter system which may not be as efficient in terms of actually using a cryptocurrency as a medium of exchange but it could help those in an informal economy qualify and quantify asset value and clear up some of the confusion around contracts and property ownership.

See also: Chinese property law and Forced evictions in China

  1. See China’s Real Estate Riddle from Patrick Chovanec, You May Own your Apartment, but who Owns the Land Underneath Your Feet? by Thomas Rippel and If Beijing is your landlord, what happens when the lease is up? from China Economic Review []
  2. See China’s Land Grab Epidemic Is Causing More Wukan-Style Protests from The Atlantic and China Tackles Land Grabs, Key Source of Rural Anger from The Wall Street Journal []
  3. See China land price fall threatens local finances from Financial Times and China’s land-seizure problem from Chicago Tribune []
  4. Internal Migration in China and the Effects on Sending Regions from OECD []

No, there is no (coming) collapse of China’s interbank system

Last week I spoke with Mark DeWeaver (video) and we touched on a number of issues related to China’s financial system but did not cover the liquidity issues that have arisen the past 6-9 months.

As a consequence, I highly recommend reading through this overview from Rhodium Group that does away with hyperbole or exaggeration to explain what is really happening: China’s Interbank Squeeze: Understanding the 2013 Drama and Anticipating 2014

 

Mike Hearn discusses autonomous agents at Turing Festival 2013

Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAO), sometimes called decentralized autonomous corporations or autonomous agents have become a hot new topic both in social media and in software engineering, especially as they are interrelated with advances in cryptoledgers/cryptocurrencies.

Vitalik Buterin has written a three-part series (1 2 3) about software-based DAOs over at the Ethereum blog that gives a pretty good overview and capability of what a DAO is able to do.  While many more volumes will be written on this topic, last Mike Hearn gave a brief overview of what hardware applications may look like:

See also: Mike Hearn’s 2012 presentation in London (video) as well as his interview last fall with Newfination (video).

Interview with Mark DeWeaver, co-founder of Quantrarian Capital Management

Earlier today I had the opportunity to interview a friend, Mark DeWeaver.  Mark is the author of Animal Spirits with Chinese Characteristics and wrote a very kind foreword for my own book.  He worked in China for 9 years and later co-founded Quantrarian Capital Management which is fully invested in the Iraqi Stock Market.

We discussed a number of topics including the “rebalancing” of China’s economic model, the Soviet tech industry during Gorbachev1 , technological innovations with regards to the Great Firewall (GFW) and spent the last 15 minutes discussing cryptocurrencies, smart property, trustless asset management and specifically an article written by Mr. Sheng from the PBOC.2

Other stories mentioned:

  1. See “The Soviet Machine-Building Complex: Perestroyka’s Sputtering Engine” from the Office of Soviet Analysis published by the Directorate of Intelligence []
  2. Mr. Sheng’s article on Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies is “虚拟货币本质上不是货币” []

Can Robert Wenzel Defeat the Encryption Used by Cryptocurrencies?

 photo NizeLinkedin.png Short answer, no.1 Back to that in a moment.

I am not sure who is doing the vetting process for investor relations at Ripple or Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), but if you are running a crypto-related business be aware that not only is Robert Wenzel (aka Raymond Nize) — the proprietor behind EconomicPolicyJournal — dogmatically anti-cryptocurrency but also not who he says he is.

Why make a blog post about this in the first place?  You may consider this water cooler minutiae and frivolous scuttlebutt, however you are known for whom you associate with.  If you hang out with known con-artists — even if you agree with some of what they say, this reflects poorly on you.  Especially when their entire motivation is not to genuinely learn about your product (crypto), but to merely hype their own investment schemes (e.g., commodities specifically gold).

Sock puppet extraordinaire

Last week I received some trollish comments from “Paul Trombley” (paul.XXXXXX@yahoo.com) regarding a lengthy post on this site (an expose of Nize’s sockpuppets), “Paul” states:

Wow. Utterly fascinating. Wish we could find out where Raymond Nize, et al., grew up and went to school, where he has worked, whom he dated, etc.

In the meantime, I will have to be content with another viewing of Pacific Heights.

A quick google search find four sites that zero in on the possible identity of “Paul”:

Obviously even if I had IP addresses this would not be a smoking gun.  But what are the chances, that a sock puppet posting on the only Nize/Wenzel thread on my site also links to EPJ and discusses many of the same topics in the same tone as Nize/Wenzel does?

Why is this important again?

Because Nize/Wenzel has managed to convince some important cryptocurrency personalities and institutions that he is someone who he is not.  He managed to convince Joseph Salerno that he has 20 years of experience on Wall Street. Where did he work?  His current LinkedIn profile (screenshot 1 2) is completely empty in all but the previous 6 years.  Surely someone with the pedigree he says he has would dutifully link to it and his past associates.

Is this an ad hominem?

No, he is making claims about his past life that are untrue which have in turn built up his credibility as a financial guru.  He has then taken these ill-gotten reputational gains and is now providing investment advice to readers and listeners of his website (which is just one of many websites he has created over the past decade under about 10 different pseudonyms, see Part IV for more).

To top it off, he has a clear anti-cryptocurrency agenda that involves spreading misinformation and/or propaganda.  In nearly every post about Bitcoin or some other aspect of cryptocurrencies he drags it through mud while simultaneously showing his inability to full comprehend how cryptography works.  Hint: if cryptography worked the way he describes it, the entire global financial industry, the diplomatic corps, cloud services and all e-commerce (to name a few) would effectively be unable to securely transmit data.  Trace Mayer did an excellent job pointing this out in the EPJ comments yesterday (SS).  Thereupon Nize notes how in his visits to both Ripple and Silicon Valley Bank he left unconvinced of cryptocurrencies potential (SS).

Strawman made of hand-waving

It is certainly understandable to not be convinced of the merits of a particular asset class, that is not the issue.  Not understanding public-key cryptography and then building bi-weekly cryptostrawman to thwack at, is a problem.  While the math may indeed be confusing to beginners and experts alike, the crypto algorithms used by cryptoledgers like Bitcoin and Litecoin are solid.

In fact, there is an monetary incentive to try and break them and no hacker has thus far been able to.2 If Nize truly believed that this crypto did not work, he could take the alleged holes he claims exist and tap into and forge 12.2 million BTC namespaces/addresses (and 25.1 million LTC).  He needs to show us a broken blockchain to prove his claim, yet has not.  If the pseudonomyous features did not work, then he could name the Top 500 BTC holders, but has not.  Disagree?  Who owns the 268th largest BTC address, the one with 4,719?  If the crypto is bad, did you break into it already?

Perhaps he will come around at some point, but this still does not justify the fraudulent personality that visitors are unaware of (and whom have given goodwill towards).  The lesson for investors doing road shows and presentations: do you due diligence and vetting upfront.3

  1. There are theoretical ways to forge entries in the blockchain, such as a 51% attack, but the crypto in the actual generic wallet most people use is currently not known to be brute-force crackable. []
  2. Nize also has epistimological problems regarding apriori utility and value but that is besides the point. See: The value of cryptocurrencies as well as Economics of Bitcoin by Peter Surda []
  3. As an aside, his Google AdSense has generated, ironically, Bitcoin-related services like Gyft that are displayed on his site — here is a screenshot. []

What are smart property and smart contracts?

I have received a number of calls and emails regarding the concept behind smart property and smart contracts which have been in the news this week.  While this topic will eventually fill volumes, if you have some time I recommend reading through these links, all written by Nick Szabo:

Speaking of which, I had a short email exchange with Mr. Szabo today (who to the chagrin of redditors, insists he is not Satoshi) and he is familiar with what is going on in the ecosystem (including projects like Mastercoin and Ethereum and people like Mike Hearn).  So if you have been following his academic output, it is pretty neat to see how his ideas (like “the god protocol“) are coming into fruition through the advent of cryptoledgers and cryptocurrencies.

I also highly recommend his piece: Shelling Out – The Origins of Money

12 Step Guide: Easiest and fastest way to start mining Scrypt-based tokens for Litecoin and Dogecoin

This past year I have received a lot of emails asking me about how to mine a cryptocurrency.  There are lots of good guides out there for setting up real mining rigs.  I used this consolidated guide last year but I recommend Cryptobadger for all current setups.

But if you really want to just test the waters with a machine you have laying around, I put together a very simple guide involving the least amount of technical prowess.

Step 1: Find, build or borrow a computer with a discrete video card made by either ATI (now AMD) or Nvidia.  Radeon cards perform the best usually by an entire order of magnitude.  Do not use a laptop because it will likely overheat and you may end up causing permanent damage to the machine (the only exception is a gaming laptop with fans/exhaust).

Step 2: Look at the Litecoin mining hardware comparison chart (even though it says Litecoin, you will end up with the same hashrate with Dogecoin or other Scrypt-based cryptocoins).  Make sure to see what parameters and settings your discrete card functions best at.

Step 3: Download the GUIMiner fork for Scrypt-based cryptocurrencies (Litecoin and Dogecoin are the two largest in this space).  Note: the original GUIMiner is designed for Bitcoin and will not work if you point it to a Scrypt-based pool.

Step 4: Look for a pool.  You will unlikely be able to “discover” one of the blocks solo-mining with your own computer at this point, thus virtually everyone connects to a pool (a group of other miners) in which you collectively are rewarded for your share of hashing.  For Dogecoin there are numerous pools, the one I’ve mentioned to my friends is Dogehouse.  For Litecoin there are also many to choose from.  The one I personally used in China was Coinotron.  Note: pay attention to pool fees.  Some of the fees can be relatively high, 5%.  This is likely due to maintenance costs to prevent DDOS attacks from taking down the pool.  Also PSA: if you plan to add a lot of hashrate I recommend joining a P2Pool to help decentralize mining.

Step 5: Sign up for a pool.  When you register at one of the pools, be sure to use a password that only you know for the front-end otherwise someone can log in and modify the remittance address to their own.  Once you have registered, you need to do two things:

1) Create a worker unit with a name like Alice.1 and give it a simple password like X.  It doesn’t matter if someone knows that unit name or password, in fact they could actually point their cards to that address and help you mine, but that is unlikely : )

2) Look at the Getting Started section of the pool website.  There you will find the information about stratum and pool connection info.  You need to insert this information into the appropriate sections on GUIMiner.

Step 6: Insert settings.  Again, find out what kind of video card your computer is using and look at the comparison chart (above) to find out what the best settings are for that card.  If you use a Radeon you can use GUIMiner’s drop-down option and it will automatically insert the setting values.  Otherwise you should just Google your video card and type “litecoin mining” or “dogecoin mining” (e.g., Radeon 7950 litecoin mining settings).  It is important to look at the specific brand as some are better than others.  CryptoBadger has a list of the best available to buy (or used).

Step 7: Test the settings.  Once all of the fields are filled in GUIMiner and you have registered at a pool, be sure to click Start on the stratum server.  Then move to the first tab and start the worker unit (GPU).  You will instantly know whether or not the stratum connection is invalid as there will be a warning statement at the bottom with “Not Connected” next to it.  If your card is actually working, you will audibly hear the fans blowing much faster and in the bottom right hand corner of GUIMiner you will see a hashrate (e.g., 600 kh/s).  If you do not see a hashrate, it is not mining.  If the Stratum connection is not working, you will not be credit with valid shares.  In the bottom left of GUIMiner it will say how many shares have been accepted as well as stales/invalid.  You can also check the mining pool interface/dashboard to see how each mining unit is doing.

Step 8: If the system is working, have it run for 5-10 minutes.  See if it crashes.  If it crashes, try to diagnose the reasons why.  Did you try to run other applications at the same time?  You will likely be able to utilize the system for any productive work as the GPU, CPU and system memory are preocuppied solving these “proof-of-work” math problems.  So do not use your main work system.  If your system crashes, you can ask the community websites (like LitecoinTalk) for help in troubleshooting the cause.  In my experience the three most common problems are 1) heat dissipation, 2) power supply & 3) intensity settings are too high.

1) Heat dissipation.  Most beginners do not realize that these GPUs will, at full load and intensity heat up to 70C+.  My own reached over 80C and operated there non-stop for months.  You need a way of dissipating this heat, either by cooling it down within a case (e.g., lots of fans or liquid cooling) or by building an open-air case (like a milk crate).  If you are using more than one GPU you will also likely need a PCI-e riser to allow air flow in your system — if the cards are next to one another they will likely crash due to heat issues.  Here is a how-to guide for installing risers.  If you want to try liquid cooling, you can follow how my friend Silas did it several years ago with Bitcoin.

2) Do not underestimate how much electricity your GPUs will suck up.  If tweaked properly for undervolting (using various software tools like MSI Afterburner and/or Trixx) you can reduce power consumption however if you’re a beginner you will likely need some spare wiggle room.  There are endless threads about the best setup but do not skimp on a good PSU.  A 750W from Corsair will power two Radeon 7950s without a hiccup.  A 600W will likely not (perhaps creating a dangerous environment).  Do not use any molex connectors or converters.  Use a real power supply that has enough native PCI-e connectors to the board.

3) Each card has its crashing point.  Push it too hard with too much heat or fail to give it enough electricity and it will crash.  Another issue, and this involves guess-and-check is to incrementally increase the workload and intensity on the GPU.  So if this is your first time, start at an intensity of 14 and build up from there.  If you start at 20 you will likely crash the system and not be able to know exactly why (e.g., did it get too hot?).  Pay attention to GPU temperature during this time, if it gets past 90C or increases from room-temperature very rapidly, it will likely crash due to heat-related issues.

Step 9: This short guide was to help you just test and start mining with whatever gear you had laying around.  If you want to throw some real money at this endeavor, I recommend looking through CryptoBadger’s site and some of the mining forums out there.  The Radeon 7950 is still probably the best value / hash / watt — but they are no longer made or sold in most countries (the exception is the HIS brand from Taiwan which can still be bought online sometimes).  You can find others on Ebay and Craigslist (or 58.com if you’re in China).

Step 10: Install a remote-login tool such as LogMeIn so you do not have to connect your system permanently to a monitor or keyboard (do not give anyone that log in info).  In most cases you can just leave the rig in a corner of a room near a window and check on it once or twice a day via the remote login.

Step 11: Calculate your hashrate and plug it into a Litecoin difficulty rating calculator.  Then look to see how much it costs in electricity to operate your rig.  Even if you are still generating dogecoin or litecoin each day, your electrical costs may create an unprofitable scenario (unless of course the tokens appreciate and/or the difficulty rating decreases).

Step 12: You have a binary decision making process.  Either turn off the rig (remember, this was supposed to be just a test run) or leave it on.  It can be a fun experiment to show your friends and family how distributed cryptoledgers actually work in terms of infrastructure, but you most likely do not want to bet the farm to build a server farm of these. [Don’t forget to get a Litecoin wallet or Dogecoin wallet to put those mined tokens in]

Coda:

I have written a few other articles on mining before (see here and here).  If you came here looking for Bitcoin mining, you are a couple years too late.  For independent hobbyists, ceteris parebus it is mathematically impossible to profit off of GPU mining for Bitcoin.  You can buy an ASIC but again, those are problematic in that there is a waiting list and you will likely not receive it in time to generate enough BTC to pay for the machine plus electrical costs.  If you want to experiment you can buy a USB ASIC for Bitcoin mining (such as a Bi•Fury) that simply plugs into a USB slot and goes to work (you do need to manage the software, I recommend Bitminter as it is the easiest to setup with.)

Another problem with the ASIC from an investment standpoint is that it is a depreciating capital good.  As the competition for hashrate continues (see this recent Bloomberg cover story) the network difficulty for Bitcoin increases dramatically by 10-30% at each reset (essentially every 2 weeks).  Thus even if you do mine enough BTC and/or it appreciates in value to the point where you pay off the initial capital costs, you will unlikely be able to resell the ASIC to anyone (because why would a buyer want to purchase a product that is no longer profitable in hashrate?).  Thus the only option you then have is to turn the ASIC box on to work on a different SHA256d proof-of-work cryptocurrency.  CoinMarketCap has a list of other altcoins, nearly all of the ones currently listed after #15 are SHA256d-based.

And if you want to try and use CGMiner or cudaMiner (for Nvidia cards) but are not sure how to, I recommend watching this video:


See also:
Should you buy an Alpha Technology ASIC for Litecoin mining?
Why it is impossible to profitably mine bitcoin (BTC) with GPUs — but still quite profitable to mine litecoins (LTC)
Dogecoin faucets list

Smart Property in the news: Counterparty.co

A new project that utilizes a cryptoledger to create decentralized, distributed trustless asset management has been making the rounds: Counterparty.co

It’s legitimate in terms of the codebase and functionality.  Thus it will be very cool to see how other similar projects (Colored Coins, Mastercoin, etc.) germinate as well.  The disruptive potential of these innovations are enormous.

Should you buy an Alpha Technology ASIC for Litecoin mining?

alpha technology viper

Short answer, probably not unless you point it to another Scrypt-based token like dogecoin.  I’ll show you the math and hypothetical situations below, but quick story.

This past spring I helped build a couple simple Sapphire 7950-based mining rigs in Shanghai for a few friends.  At the time the new Vapor-X cards cost around $300 each and could be tweaked to run at around 600 kh/s (in line with these hardware expectations). [Note: This was also just before Cryptobadger, who has a great series of how-to guides, highly recommended if you’re interested in doing-it-yourself.]

Fast forward to early December, virtually all physical stores in any big city throughout China were sold out of the following Radeon models: 7950, 7970, R280, R280X.  My friends spent hours calling up and chatting to online shops from Taobao and Tmall to try and locate any supplier with product.  But all were backlogged for the next couple of weeks.  Why?  What had happened is that the price of litecoin tokens had popped on exchanges (namely BTCe and OKCoin) by a factor of 10x in less than 3 weeks ($2 to $20).  Yet the difficulty rating was still (temporarily) at around a mere 1,000 meaning that the return-on-investment for even a small rig composed of 7950s was relatively quick.  However that capital expenditure / token profit information traveled rather quickly, ending up on a variety of domestic evening newscasts.  And thus, there was a mad dash to get these GPUs.  As a consequence, I spent one early December weekend during this time combing the PC malls in Changning district trying to find any owner who could supply a couple dozen 7950s all in an effort to help some of my friends build a litecoin mining farm.  Yet each laoban explained (with a smile) that some large buyer had bought the remaining stock en masse — store by store.

We didn’t build that farm and in the short-run that may be okay.  While some miners simply look at the short-term seigniorage of flipping a few blocks, long-term mining operations probably will hold onto whatever tokens with a view that the tokens will appreciate by an order of magnitude.  Thus, while the collective hashrate for the capital expenditures for the 50 GPU cards my friends wanted to buy would have certainly been considered a profitable investment at the 1,000 difficulty rating, the longer term capital risks are substantially higher because the spread in crypto mining, like other commodity gathering, tends towards equilibrium (e.g., the cost of mining eventually equals the financial returns).  That is to say, the extra units of profitability (or unprofitablity) sends a signal to market participants to either continue one particular activity (like mining) or to shut down mining operations altogether.  You see this frequently in other capital intensive resource gathering spaces such as petroleum extraction as well as precious metals (e.g., if the revenue / barrel increases, other competitors will invest in new extraction techniques and/or open fields for development yet if the revenue / barrel decreases, competitors may shut off all production in a particular field).1

Again, crypto mining involves a scarce resource (block discovery in which the coin or token are part of) and in order to mine you need capital investment, in the form of a GPU.  Thus the same issues of supply, demand, price discovery and profitability now exist.2

ASIC mining

In 2011, Scrypt was adopted as the proof-of-work mechanism used by the Litecoin protocol.  It was purposefully chosen by Charlie Lee due the understanding that it was more resistant (not necessarily immune) to GPU and ASIC mining than the SHA256d proof-of-work used by the Bitcoin protocol.  And after two years into this altcoin experiment this assumption seems to have empirically played itself out as there have been no known litecoin ASICs.

Yet now that litecoin tokens are trading at ~$25+ each, the return-on-investment for physical design engineers (the people who actually design integrated circuits) to develop an ASIC has become within the realm of profitability for even something designed to be resistant such as litecoin.  That is to say, some group of investors believes that the capital costs of hiring a team to design, fab and sell an ASIC to litecoin miners is profitable (otherwise they wouldn’t do it).

At the end of last month, Alpha Technology in the UK announced that they were at the finishing stages of design for two products, a 5 MH/s and 25 MH/s ASIC for litecoin (remember, the ASIC you buy and use for bitcoin mining cannot be used for litecoin mining because it is designed specifically to work on one particular proof-of-work).  The 5 MH/s is expected to need 100W and the 25 MH/s version is targeted at 600W.

According to the announcement, the cost for the Viper 5 MH/s is £1350 ($2209) and the 25 MH/s is £5450 ($8918).  Not including electricity, taxes, shipping and pool fees, the top Viper at 25 MH/s works out to be around 2.8 khash per dollar.  This compares with a ~$300 for a new Sapphire Vapor-X 7950 @ 600 kh/s which is around 2 khash per dollar. [Note: most 7950s are no longer assembled as such and are now rebadged as R280, the big exceptions are HIS from Taiwan.  Cryptobadger has a run-down of the best cards available.]

Risks and variable factors

Despite looking legitimate through press releases and 3D renderings, the product might never come out.  Or when it does get released (probably late), the real numbers might be way off the estimates.

For example, last March a good friend of mine paid 50 BTC for 100 GHash/s ASIC from Butterfly Labs.  He received it more than 6 months later at the end of November.  If instead he had held that 50 BTC he would have been able to sell for $40,000 – 50,000 on many exchanges.  Instead, if you plug that 100 GH/s rate into a mining calculator, he will not even be able to mine 1 BTC for the next year at the current difficulty rating let alone ever be able to mine 50 BTC it cost to buy them.

So here is the likely scenario with Alpha Technology.  They will not ship for at least another two months.   Why?  The inner engineer in me asks: Has it passed verification process?3 Has it been taped out? What about maskmaking?  Those they do ship to are those who ordered first and there is a wait list (here’s a widely inaccurate waitlist).  Each minute you wait is another minute someone else will be ahead of you.

Now, assuming you were able to get the Viper 25 MH/s today, looking at the mining calculator to see how many litecoin tokens you would receive at the current difficulty (3366.7), the number is: 2408 LTC / year.4 Assuming the network hashrate does not collapse, that is the most optimal scenario you have this year.  And the highest price an LTC has gone for on an exchange so far was $50-$60 back in late November/ early December last year.  If this price level is ever reached again and the difficult rating never changed, then you would stand to make ~$125,000 which would make your $8,918 investment very fruitful!

But alas, this is not how it works.  Again, assuming the product is made and even shipped on time, the difficulty rating will continue to increase proportional to the additional hashrate.  So as more and more of these Viper’s (and/or other GPUs, FPGAs and ASICs) are added to the network, the higher the difficulty rating is adjusted to.

The next estimated difficulty rating is expected to be 3700 which knocks off 20 LTC more a month, dropping you down to around 2150 LTC / year.  But this is not the entire story.  You still need to factor in electricity costs, the transportation and shipping fees (unless you live next to the manufacturing and distribution center) as well as the pool fees.  Some pool fees, like at Coinotron which I used are 5% (it is this high in part because of the maintenance and admin costs needed to protect against DDOS attacks). 5

In all likelihood, unless you are the very first person on the list when the product ships, you would be better off either building an off-the-shelf GPU mining solution or buying LTC on an exchange and either hold for speculation and/or arbitrage.

Why?

Even if your electricity was free, you lived in the UK/India/China where they are manufactured and were the first person on the pre-order list, your first mover advantage would be quickly eroded by other Viper owners.  To give you an idea why, look at the current Litecoin Mining Pool hashrate.  If 200 other consumers bough 1 of each Viper, they would collectively add 6,000 MH/s which would place these ASICs alone as the 6th largest pool, increasing the hashrate proportionally (this is actually conservative because difficulty typically trails hashrate).

If litecoin difficulty doubled to 6,000 at current price levels ($27) and a 25 MH/s hashrate you would generate 125.7 LTC / month and earn enough monthly ($3,423) to pay for the machine in 3 months.

But instead, let’s assume for the moment that other market participants have access to similar mining calculators and how-to Cryptobadger guides.  And that over the next 6-9 months the difficulty rating jumps to 30,000 (9x the level today).  Impossible you say?  Last April when I got the initial litecoin rigs up and running, the difficulty rating was 300.  So in less than 9 months the rating has gone up 11x.

If it reaches 30,000 you would only generate 25.15 LTC / month which at ~$27 / token would generate $684 / month.  That means you would likely only generate enough litecoins (at current prices) to cover the costs for the Viper in the first year (ignoring all other pool fees, electricity costs, taxes, duties, etc.).

Sure the tokens could appreciate and increase in value, but as we continue to see, if price levels increase so too would competitor hashrate as others see a similar seigniorage opportunity.

That said, if these numbers are real, this Viper ASIC is only 40% better than GPUs in terms of hash/dollar. Of course this is just the first generation and other companies might be able to make more efficient chips. But this definitely is a positive sign that Scrypt hashing might be able to keep ASICs from totally dominating mining like it does with sha256d.

Money well spent?

One thing to constantly remind yourself is that like any investment, you should only spend money you can lose.  That is to say, as bullish as you may be on any particular asset class (including cryptocurrencies) there is always a statistical possibility that its liquid price could sink below whatever level you have bought at (e.g., underwater).  Perhaps even falling to zero.

If history is any guide (and perhaps it is not) looking back at the California Gold Rush (the 49ers) the firms who ended up financially in the black were merchants and service companies such as Samuel Brannan, Philip Armour, John Studebaker, Levi Strauss and Wells Fargo.6 Those who also made and sold mining equipment (picks, axes, shovels, sluices) had mixed results.  Yet the group of people who typically fared the worst financially were the miners themselves as they were nearly all exposed to various types of risks (upfront capital costs, land title lawsuits, inclement weather, sickness, etc.) and as a consequence, most ended up bankrupt.

Does this mean you should not purchasing crypto mining equipment?  No, but you are probably more exposed to risks with fewer potential upsides than downsides.  Your capital is tied up into a depreciating asset, a machine which unlike a GPU that can be resold, has a singular use that may or may not be delivered on time with unknown hashrate performance deltas.  Or you could be thinking, just like the first people who managed to get an Avalon batch last winter or a KnC miner when they ship new updates throughout the year (like the upcoming Neptune), perhaps you might be lucky enough to get a Viper that lives up to its paper reputation.7  But the odds are you won’t, especially if you are reading this and have not pre-ordered it.

One other option for HNWI is that you could invest in an IC design company such as Alchip which does the physical design for KnC.8 Or create your own engineering team to build ASIC machines for internal use only and sell public shares just like ASICMiner in Guangdong did last year.

Lastly, for entrepreneurs there are other areas to focus on beyond the token such as the financial instruments and applications discussed by Mike Hearn in 2012 that utilize the Bitcoin or Litecoin protocol (e.g.,  secure time-stampingproving ownership of tangible propertydecentralized DNS and new ways to sign contracts).9

Exhibit A:

Below is a very rudimentary table that utilizes this Litecoin difficulty calculator.10  The calculator is nowhere near advanced as the dynamic dashboard over at Genesis Block (which is BTC only).  In fact, this chart below does not include in its calculations the long tail of the difficulty curve.  It is an end-to-end snapshot (what it is today versus what it will be 6 months from now).  But that is unneeded as this shows you that in every instance, building GPU-based systems instead of buying the ASIC is probably more profitable in the first 6 months.  In some cases, merely buying LTC and holding is actually more profitable.

I should point out that for this activity I negated electrical costs which obviously are non-negligible especially for a large GPU farm.  Obviously an ASIC will come out per watt more efficient, so feel free to factor in whatever electrical costs you may pay on a monthly basis in your region.  I also assumed the consumer would be able to buy 32 new or used Vapor-X 7950s for $200 each and then simply build a barebone system using milkcrates as per Cryptobadger (Friendly reminder: anything that is not the GPU is not generating tokens and is therefore a money sink — you do not need fancy cases or i7 CPUs).  It is probably very difficult to locate 32 of these GPUs, let alone 42 for Scenario 4.  But you could likely find batches of used versions on eBay, Craigslist and other etailers.  They do not even need to be the Sapphire brand; see this chart for more comparisons.

The biggest difficulties for a massive GPU farm like that however will be logistics, cooling and storage.  You would need to have access to reliable power and internet sources.  You would also need to keep an eye on each of the GPUs throughout the day to make sure they are performing up to snuff (I actually used LogMeIn but I think Cryptobadger’s method is much more efficient).

Still, I would speculate that in all likelihood, the Viper is unlikely to be delivered to your door within the next 90 days.  If that is the case your two profitable options (based on this chart) are to buy and hold LTC and/or build a rig or two (depending on if you can get them used and what your electrical costs are).

One last note, I do not predict that LTC price levels will reach the numbers listed in this chart this year (if ever).  These are for illustrative purposes only.  In contrast, if price levels do continue to increase I would expect the difficulty rating to increase in a corresponding manner and that the lopsided disconnect in the last column would never germinate.  Baseline difficulty is 3300 and starting LTC price is $27.

Investment Option ETA Setup cost in USD and LTC Difficulty increases same as 6 mo. historical avg and LTC stays at current price Difficulty increases same as 6 mo. historical avg and LTC increases at 6 mo. historical avg Difficulty increases less than 6 mo. historical avg and LTC increases at 6 mo. historical avg Difficulty increases more than 6 mo. historical avg and LTC increases at 6 mo. historical avg Difficulty increases same as 6 mo. historical avg and LTC increases at less than 6 mo. historical avg Difficulty increases same as 6 mo. historical avg and LTC increases at more than 6 mo. historical avg
Difficulty x4 @ 13200, LTC @ $27 on July 6th 2014 Difficulty x4 @ 13200, LTC x9 @ $243 on July 6th 2014 Difficulty x2 @6600, LTC x9 @ $243 on July 6th 2014 Difficulty x8 @ 26400, LTC x9 @ $243 on July 6th 2014 Difficulty x4 @13200, LTC x4.5 @ $121.5 on July 6th 2014 Difficulty x4 @13200, LTC x13.5 @ $364.5 on July 6th 2014
Scenario 1 Preorder 25MH/s Viper today  1/6/2014 Delivered in April $8900 or 329.6 LTC (no fees) Begin April 6th and after 3 months hashing = $4,890 or 171.45 LTC $41,662 or 171.45 LTC $83,324 or 342.9 LTC $20,511.63 or 84.81 LTC $20,831.17 or  171.45 LTC $62,493.52 or 171.45 LTC
Scenario 2 Preorder 25MH/s Viper today  1/6/2014 Delivered in July $8900 or 329.6 LTC (no fees) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 3 Buy mining rig with OTS GPUs worth $8900 today Start mining in 1-2 weeks $8900 or 329.6 LTC (no fees) 32 Vapor 7950s (Milkcrates) after 6 months hashing =  $7512 or 263.34 LTC $63,991.62 or 263.34 LTC $127,983.24 or 526.68 LTC $31,995.81 or 131.67 LTC  $31,995.81 or 263.34 LTC $95,987.43 or 263.34 LTC
Scenario 4 Buy mining rig with OTS GPUs @ 25 MH/s today Start mining in 1-2  weeks $8900 or 329.6 LTC (no fees) 42 Vapor 7950s (Milkcrates) after 6 months hashing =  $9780 or  342.9 LTC $83,324.7 or 342.9 LTC $166,649.4 or 685.8 LTC $41,662.35 or 171.45 LTC $41,662.35 or 342.9 LTC $124,987.05 or 342.9 LTC
Scenario 5 Invest $8900 (cost of Viper) into LTC today Buy and hold 329.6 LTC $8,900 $80,092.8 or 329.6 LTC $80,092.8 or 329.6 LTC $80,092.8 or 329.6 LTC $40,0046.4 or 329.6 LTC $120,139.2 or 329.6 LTC

See also: Why it is impossible to profitably mine bitcoin (BTC) with GPUs — but still quite profitable to mine litecoins (LTC)

  1. The Mountain Pass rare earth mineral mine is an example of a mine that was recently restarted due to these economic conditions of supply, demand and profitability. []
  2. While you can read through the developmental history of both Bitcoin (the network) and bitcoin (the token), the original miners and early adopters from 2009 and 2010 mined for a variety of reasons and motivations.  Perhaps accumulation and appreciation were among those, yet the first “real” exchange didn’t occur until May 21st, 2010 — a $25 pizza was exchanged for 10,000 BTC.  See This Pizza Cost $750,000 from Motherboard. []
  3. See Automate and Control the Functional-Verification Process from Chip Design, Interview: Adnan Hamid Addresses Trends In Chip Verification from Electronic Design and Chip verification made easy by Laurent Fournier []
  4. Difficulty rating for Bitcoin adjusts every 2016 clocks or roughly every 2 weeks []
  5. Not to mention there is always the potential downtime in the even there is a net outage or electrical problem where the machine is located.  Unless you put it in a colocation, your machine’s uptime will be directly effected by where you live. []
  6. Contrary to popular myth Sears & Roebucks did not exist at this time and in fact was founded much later in its modern form in 1893.  It was Richard Sears’ father, James who went to California during the gold rush and failed to become rich. []
  7. See Engineering the Bitcoin Gold Rush: An Interview with Yifu Guo, Creator of the First Purpose-Built Miner from Motherboard and That Swedish Bitcoin Mining Company Has Sold $28 Million-Worth Of Its New Mining Hardware from Business Insider []
  8. See Alchip, KnCMiner team up for Bitcoin mining machine with 28nm ASIC from DigiTimes []
  9. There may also be other opportunities for a startup to focus on: hedging exposure, quantifying and qualifying risks and perhaps even insuring or re-insuring []
  10. I recommend reading through this Litecoin community thread which includes a very detailed chart based on estimated hashrates and difficulties. []

Cryptocurrency Cat-and-Mouse games in China

btcc voucherSeveral updates to this ongoing cryptocurrency story in China and elsewhere (each subheading below is a slightly different topic).

Yesterday Bill Bishop linked to a story posted at Sina, “虚拟货币本质上不是货币” written by Sheng Songcheng.  Mr. Sheng is the head official of investigation and statistics at the PBOC (the central bank).

Bishop’s quick comment of the article was that, “No reason the belie[f] there will be any positive news from PRC regulators about bitcoin, or that somehow the recent crackdown was good, as some of the bitcoin bulls have been trying to spin.”

Too long; didn’t read

In addition to Bishop’s nutshell, another tl;dr comment that I would add is this, because Mr. Sheng works for the PBOC, his essay pretty much encapsulates what that important organ of the government thinks. Based on his essay, they do not recognize Bitcoin’s legality (although there is no clear indicator that they see a difference between protocol and token) and according to his own words, without government oversight or backing by any country, the token itself has no value.  Mr. Sheng uses the example of the recent 60% price drop of the bitcoin token on BTCChina last month as proof that without government approval, it has little value (a correlation-causation fallacy).  Furthermore, he thinks that if there is a developing country (such as China) that does begin using it, the deflationary aspect (the fixed ‘money’ / token supply) would actually present an obstacle and hinder the country’s economy to grow.  In fact, he says that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies will never become a country’s major currency and as a consequence, will not be a “real” currency.  And that it could only become so in the “utopian view of technocrats and libertarians” (技术至上主义和绝对自由主义者的乌托邦).  Yes, he uses the Chinese word for idyllic libertarian  (绝对自由主义者).

From a technical viewpoint, he states all cryptocurrencies do not have a unique origin, nor are its token generation, exchange and storage methods particularly special.  Any currency that has Bitcoin’s features could replace it such as Litecoin, which the public has become familiar with.  And continuing, he states that Bitcoin does not have any physical attributes found in gold and silver nor exclusivity enforced by the law so it will be really easy to replace.  Therefore it cannot replace the role of general currency which is the medium of trading. Thus his overall attitude (and that of the PBOC) is that the central government does not recognize any specific values of the token; that it is illegal to use (though he does not specifically say who or what timeframe) and it doesn’t justify its own existence.

Again, while we can argue over the epistemological, economic and technical problems with this essay (e.g., why do economies grow, deflation versus inflation [pdf], the economics of Bitcoin [pdf], what utility cryptocurrencies have, how the protocol works, etc.) all of which have been discussed elsewhere, as Bishop noted above, this essay is hardly a positive sign for the crytpocurrency segment in China.  Thus, while speculative, after reading the article the impression readers are left with is that the PBOC will crack down on cryptocurrencies on the mainland for the foreseeable future.

Cat-and-mouse

There have been discussions over the past weeks as to how mainland exchanges could bypass the current hurdles.  One idea was to create yet another type of virtual token that could then be exchanged on exchanges.

Over the past couple of hours on reddit, users have posted a new method that BTCChina is using to get around the current depository predicament the mainland industry is currently in (e.g., all payment processors are barred from providing fiat liquidity to crypto exchanges).  However, the small stop-gap solution is for BTCChina customers internally (this is not the same thing as the online vouchers like BTCe has).  BTCC code is to allow one customer with CNY on the site to sell the CNY to another customer.  The medium is the BTCC code which is in two parts: one is for the customer the other is for the site.

Imaginary Capital Markets has a few more details and screenshots, but let me just emphasize once more that this is not a complete workaround (yet) but just a way for BTCC users to exchange CNY with one another.  My speculation: if the CEO role as sole depositor is still active, perhaps this could be a way for him/her to distribute funds to friends & family who can then exchange the fund to the wider customer base.  If this is the case, perhaps other exchanges will follow suit (assuming that the CEO can still deposit funds into the exchange through their personal account, see the explanation here for more).

[Update: Taobao has a new rule (Chinese) that will ban the buying and selling of crypto coins.  Thus it will purportedly impact vouchers such as those being offered by BTCChina]

Also regarding the CEO bank accounts I discussed the past two weeks, Eric Meng, an American attorney friend of mine currently in China explained to me that the use of personal bank accounts to do business is a huge red flag in general.   It does not mean that anything is being done illegally, but it’s something that investigators watch out for.1

Bots again

Regarding the purported fudged numbers on Chinese exchanges (discussed here), another friend (in Europe) recently wrote to me explaining that someone could easily write a bot and test the liquidity to see whether it is real or not.  It could be that some exchanges on the global stage act as a market maker (similar to the NYSE which employs “specialists” [pdf explanation] who always make sure that there is a reasonable bid and ask available and who take short term positions in order to provide liquidity).

This same friend who has both mined and then built proprietary HFT arb software on BTCe is reasonably sure that BTCe runs their own arbitrage bots with zero fees but sometimes turns them off (or they have certain limits, he is not sure).  Again, arbitrage is not bad per se and basically makes sure that you can execute your orders at a ‘fair price’ all time.  Of course it would be better if the exchanges are more forthcoming about what they do behind the scenes but as long as there are no regulations they can do whatever they want and earn some extra money.  Yet again, no one is forced to use a particular exchange so people can easily vote with their feet or open their own (transparent) exchange.

Notes in the margin

One last comment I received is from Mark DeWeaver (author of Animal Spirits with Chinese Characteristics and GWON’s Foreword) is that,

It occurred to me that the argument about bitcoin having a big “carbon footprint” is really poorly thought out.  Is the footprint really bigger than that of paper currency, which has to be transported from countless businesses to bank’s safe deposit boxes at the end of each day.  And think of all the gas people must burn on trips to ATM’s!

This is in response to my explanation of Charles Stross’ contention that cryptocurrencies are more of a burden on the environment than fiat currencies are (they are not).  Mark’s comments are empirically valid because these up-armored vehicles (typically Ford 550 chassis or similar classes from competitors) are frequently used to move fiat currencies to and from distribution centers to branch banks and ATMs.  For example, The Armored Group currently lists many used armor transportation cars for sale.  And a quick search on Fuelly gives you an idea of how much fuel the average F550 consumes in the city (~9 mpg).  This also ignores the supply chain needed to build the vehicles in the first place which is an entire logistical segment that cryptocurrencies do not need.  Nor does it include the carbon consumption of the driver and guards ferried around in the vehicles (e.g., eating, sleeping, shelter, etc.).  One can only imagine the sheer number of vehicles in developing countries where digital fiat are not nearly as common and thus paper/metal is transported more frequently.

Again, this is not to say that cryptocurrencies are mana from heaven, that they won’t be replaced or will somehow axiomatically usher in a world of milk and honey.  But these specific claims by detractors need to be backed up with real numbers as they are positive claims (e.g., burden of proof).  If you do think that the Bitcoin transaction network (the most computationally powerful, public distributed system currently)2 consumes more carbon than all ~200 fiat currencies right now, you need to prove that.  And from my quick research I detailed in my article, that does not seem to be the case (today).

Also, for other occasional commentary on crypto in China I recommend visiting my friend’s site, Aha Moments (specifically this recent post).  Drop him a note and tell him to update more.

  1. Eric also suggested I link to the following guide that potential investors conducting due diligence pay attention to in the aftermath of Madoff: Six Red Flags and Tips for Investment Risks from CAMICO. []
  2. See Global Bitcoin Computing Power Now 256 Times Faster Than Top 500 Supercomputers, Combined! from Forbes []

Why Huobi purportedly has higher volume than BTCChina and OKCoin

[Note: I posted an earlier draft at reddit, below is a revised and expanded edition]

For those unfamiliar with Huobi, it is now the largest BTC exchange in China doing roughly 40,000-80,000 in volume a day (versus 4,000 at OKCoin) – though these numbers could be suspect (see the last section below).  Earlier today I spoke with my friend who is building an exchange in Shanghai who explained the volume discrepancy.

The way the current exchanges in China are nearly all set up is that all of the trading is actually conducted using the CEO’s personal bank account.  That is to say, none of the exchanges (at first) utilized a corporate account.  At some point this past year the big exchanges managed to switch to corporate accounts in some form or fashion.  So on top of the 3rd party payment provider ban issues last week, the CEOs at the big exchanges (probably) expect some kind of crackdown on personal accounts so they are trying to go completely legitimate and avoid the risks associated with personal liability.1

Thus Li Lin (CEO of Huobi) is shouldering a great deal of risk that neither Bobby Lee (BTCChina) nor Xu Mingxing (OKCoin) no longer are willing to do any longer (see below for several reasons why).

The other reason for Lin’s success is that he has an individual account with each bank (ICBC, BoC, ABC, CCB, SPD, etc.) so his system does not utilize an interbank transfer (other exchanges may have used that same method as well, I do not know). Again this is largely due to the current legal policy (which has existed for as long as I lived there) in which you cannot just move money from a corporate account to a personal account without a fapiao.2

Note: if you are a big trader, right now you would want to use Huobi to buy BTC (as it is the easiest/fastest way to do so) but use BTCChina for actual trading (due to its API/bot functionality and features).  Why?  Because ceteris parebus as the big exchanges get closer to zero liquidity then there will likely be larger arbitrage spread opportunities.3

Personal and commercial accounts

A reddit user asked, “so the government restriction doesn’t apply to deposits sent through a CEO’s personal bank account?”

As of right now, it does not. But the CEO part is not necessarily the linchpin as outlined by some specific bank policy. The exchanges use the CEOs personal account due to liability issues, how bank transactions take place (personal versus corporate) and how corporate structures work in China (e.g., you do not ask the intern to use their personal account even though it is roughly the same as the one the CEO uses). The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) could restrict that directly if it chose to irrespective of whether or not you have a fapiao (invoice).

Which brings up another overlooked issue entirely, why is a fapiao necessary? Basically if you want to move money from a corporate account to your personal account, you need to have a “chopped” (印章) invoice for each transaction.4 Even if you own the corporate account, in China you have to present this fapiao for each exchange. You can imagine the logistical and paperwork burden that would place on say a bitcoin exchange that processes tens of thousands of transactions a day.  China Briefing has a good a explanation of how a fapiao works.

And as mentioned earlier, one of the speculations right now is that Bobby Lee and others believe that there will be a crackdown on personal accounts and that is the reason why they stopped doing it (you would have to ask them though).

I personally would never allow my account to be used like that as it really puts you in a bad legal liability position if someone you sent/received money from ends up doing something illegal. You could be held liable as accessory to whatever crime or even more directly, enabled money laundering to take place (depending on jurisdiction).5  But again, this is a personal preference and there are obvious huge financial rewards for taking that risk right now.

Outright banning

Another reddit user asked, “why would the government not try to close personal accounts used for BTC exchanges?”

The answers are completely speculative (unless the person you talk to works for the PBOC).

Ultimately the PBOC has the authority to ban cryptocurrency exchanges on the mainland and even ban the commercial use of it. But they have (so far) chosen not to. This is not an accident and again let there be no doubt that they can ban nearly the entire ecosystem within China immediately (e.g., exchanges, merchants, POS, even large ASIC facilities).

Why haven’t they?  Perhaps they want to control it which is significantly easier if there are just a couple of big exchanges and not many small ones (there were ~20 about 2 months ago, it is unclear how many there are today).

Perhaps connected members in the PBOC and its peer organs in the Party appartus are indeed making money off of BTC as some have speculated, but this is impossible to tell unless an address is verified.  For example, on a small, distributed 1-1 scale, bitcoin exchanges are essentially untraceable (e.g., act as massive “tumblers“) and the Chinese personal banking system makes 1-1 transfers very easy.

Obviously Chinese policy makers cannot afford to undermine their dollar assets, but they more than likely want a multi-currency world and by creating this additional uncertainty in the FOREX market it encourages currency plurality. That is to say if you are unsure about the USD, you will also hold Euro and RMB.  However, the RMB cannot replace USD now because of capital controls and if that is their goal, the road to adoption is extremely long as RMB settlements account for ~2% globally.6

Padded numbers

According to some news accounts, OKCoin (and likely others) may have been fudging its volume numbers which could explain part of the large drop in recent volume.  This of course is disconcerting in that it hurts the credibility of all exchanges and only adds ammo for critics who claim that exchange operators can do a lot of front running since there is currently little transparency (e.g., who is to say anyone besides the exchange itself is actually trading on exchange X or Y?).

As a consequence, this same friend recently told me how Xu Mingxing may have brought unwanted attention to his own account because of those huge posted volume numbers.

And again, my point about the CEO account link above was to illustrate the operational risks involved with creating financial startups on the mainland.  Prior to the Bobby Lee inauguration, all of BTCChina’s deposits purportedly went to the co-founder Yang Linke.  Perhaps there will be another personal account method used there in the future.  We will find out shortly.  And as long as the customers are fine with it, it is/was apparently much easier in terms of accounting to try this method.  Thus it will be interesting to see how the industry hedges those risks/liabilities in the future and to see what areas the Chinese policy makers restrict next.

  1. The PBOC issued guidelines prohibiting 3rd party intermediaries and payment processors such as Alipay and Tenpay from transferring CNY (renminbi) to and from cryptocurrency exchanges.  This effectively put an end to all mainland based CNY deposits for BTC exchanges.  See Bitcoin Value Sinks After Chinese Exchange Move from The New York Times and Doubling down, China bans transactions between Bitcoin exchanges and 3rd-party payment companies from Tech In Asia []
  2. Again while speculative, the “new” exchange system implemented at Huobi and others may be very low tech and simply involve a person using internet banking to manually transfer and approve all funds.  This is much slower than the automation previously used. []
  3. If you want to cut your teeth programming HFT bot software, you can use the open source cryptrade libraries at git and join the community at Cryptotrader.org []
  4. See Chinese Chops Or Seals from About.com and What is a Chinese “Chop” or Seal? from Yahoo! []
  5. There is no global standard yet, Singapore’s government is taking a hands off approach towards cryptocurrency right now whereas Denmark plans to regulate and oversee its use. []
  6. For an explanation as to why the RMB will not replace the USD anytime soon see this overview with Patrick Chovanec from earlier this year.  I also recommend reading the Debt and Reserves section from Michael Pettis’ note in October.  In addition readers are encouraged to read the highlights of this Bloomberg report on the hypothetical issue of Chinese institutions “dumping” the USD en masse. []

What happened with the “cash crunch” in China two weeks ago?

While there have been many explanations for why the People’s Bank of China (temporarily) allowed (easy) credit to dry up, I think Mark DeWeaver has a very plausible and well-reasoned explanation.  Mark wrote the foreword to my book and is the author of Animals Spirits with Chinese Characteristics.

Below is his op-ed published two days ago in The Wall Street Journal.  Be sure to check out his predictions for why this solution probably will not stick:

Beijing’s War on Shadow Banking

China’s central bank cracks down on credit that is not under the government’s control.

On June 20, China’s central bank precipitated a major credit crisis by withholding funds from the nation’s cash-starved banking system. The People’s Bank of China’s refusal to act as liquidity provider of last resort froze lending in the interbank market. Overnight rates, which had been as low as 2.1% in early May, exploded, closing at a record 13.4%.

As rumors swirled about the solvency of China’s state-owned banks, some commentators began talking about a Chinese “Lehman moment.” But the crisis passed and the overnight interbank lending rate quickly came back to earth. By July 4, it had fallen to 3.4%.

Trouble in the interbank market had been brewing since early June, when Beijing began a crackdown on illicit inflows of foreign exchange, previously a major source of growth in the local money supply. The demand for yuan also began rising, as Chinese banks prepared for their June 30 book closings and their customers for their first-half tax payments.

The result was a growing imbalance between the supply of and demand for credit. As rumored large-scale interventions by the People’s Bank of China repeatedly failed to materialize, commercial banks realized they would have to fend for themselves. Lenders hoarded cash to guard against potential counterparty defaults, and the normal flow of funds among financial institutions quickly dried up.

The central bank’s immediate objective seems to have been to rein in China’s “shadow banking” system, which has grown rapidly in recent years and now accounts for a significant share of total Chinese credit. Shadow banking in China involves lightly regulated products that allow savers to earn more than the official deposit rate while providing financing for “subprime” borrowers.

Generally the funding is relatively short-term, which makes the business highly sensitive to liquidity conditions. Shadow lenders require inflows of new money to pay off maturing obligations. These typically come either directly from the banks—for example, via their “wealth management products”—or from entities with access to bank financing such as state-owned enterprises.

There may be a larger political game going on. The People’s Bank of China is not an independent central bank, so the order to turn off the credit spigot must have come directly from the Politburo. The central bank’s surprise attack on bank credit must therefore be understood in the context of the leadership’s current focus on improving economic efficiency. This objective will be impossible to achieve unless the central government can overcome resistance from the powerful local interests that benefit from the status quo. The Politburo’s goal may have been to starve opponents of reform into submission.

Local governments appear to be the central bank’s real targets, because they rely heavily on shadow financing to subvert Beijing’s reform initiatives. Shadow funds flow directly into local government projects that the central government views as wasteful, and the funds benefit localities indirectly by pushing up land prices. As long as this money keeps flowing, over-investment in infrastructure, heavy industry and real estate will continue unchecked and Beijing’s vision of a new economy driven mainly by consumer demand and productivity growth will be impossible to realize.

The credit crunch occurred a few days after the launch of the Communist Party’s new “mass line” campaign, which seeks to make the party more sensitive to the needs of the people by circumventing official government and party hierarchies. This idea goes back to Mao Zedong, for whom the goal was to realize “democratic centralism” and bypass bureaucratic factions that threatened his agenda. Going directly to the “masses” was a way to attack the opposition from the outside—to “bombard the headquarters” in a famous slogan of the Cultural Revolution era.

In Mao’s time, bombarding the headquarters meant unleashing a reign of terror. Today the leadership has turned to less violent means. The central bank’s strike against shadow banking will undermine today’s vested interests in a way that Mao could scarcely have imagined—simply by cutting off their financing.

There are two problems with this approach. First, the central bank’s policy will result in considerable collateral damage. Small- and medium-size private firms will be particularly hard hit. They tend to be ineligible for bank loans and often depend on shadow financing to make ends meet.

Second, attacking anti-reform factions will not be enough to generate real reform. Without radical changes in the economic role of local governments, they will quickly return to business as usual once the fallout has cleared.

The People’s Bank of China may have won a battle, but the Politburo is far from winning the war.

Cryptocurrency in the news: III

Thanks to Isaac, Vijay, Raffael, Aaron and other nameless ones.

I may have found the Drudge formula and Raymond Nize

Ray Nize and the Marine

Ray Nize, aka Robert Wenzel (left) and an anonymous Marine

[Note: scroll down to Part IV for sock-puppets and identities]

Yesterday I may have been given a SEO scheme purportedly devised by Robert Wenzel (just one alias, see bottom for other possible names) that supposedly allows its users to receive direct hyperlinks from sites like DrudgeReport.com.  The scheme remains unharmed and no hacking took place to retrieve it.

I would link to the website maintained by Robert called EconomicPolicyJournal.com (warning: IP malware) but users will inadvertently copy the entire contents of the website.  Modern browsers such as IE, Firefox, Safari and Opera — by default — copy the content of websites that are visited into a temporary directory.  This action instantly reproduces the exact CSS and HTML code on a given site and can be done without the express written permission of a site proprietor.  Yet the original site remains unscathed, all of the information and data — the digitized mathematical patterns — remain unharmed.

Anachronistically, Robert is under the impression that information is scarce.  Here is an example to illustrate that information is not scarce.

If you are reading this, please follow this short guide:

  • Step 1: Open up a copy of a word processor (MS Word, Google Docs, LibreWriter)
  • Step 2: Go to the homepage of your favorite website (TheOnion.com of course)
  • Step 3: Press Crtl – A   (this will highlight everything on this site)
  • Step 4: Press Crtl – C  (this will temporarily copy all of this content on to your computer clipboard)
  • Step 5: Go back to your word processor
  • Step 6: Press Crtl – V  (this will paste everything that was highlighted into the word document)

If you follow these instructions you will have successfully reproduced all information bit-by-bit without the original site losing anything.  The integrity of the original data remains disabused on the host servers of TheOnion.

Throughout each day, artificial intelligent scripts called “robots” or “spiders” continually scour the internet scanning, copying and pasting content — yet the sites they visit never are at a loss of property.  The reason why is information is not scarce in the economic sense (see Scarcity, Rivalrous and Against Intellectual Property).  Thus when robots and spiders created by Google, Yahoo, Bing and even Baidu to catalog the internet pore through your site, they are not “stealing” anything or acting as information pirates (nothing is stolen as the original remains unperturbed) but rather they are merely reproducing the exact data structures as they appear.  And thus sites that Google or Bing scan, are not deprived of the original data.  Or in layman’s parlance: no data or information is harmed in the making of this post.

Yet time and again (I would link to his sites but do not want users to inadvertently, accidentally download other IP malware) Robert contends that some kind of theft is taking place.  In other words, he contends that users have somehow physically taken something and he thus has the right to excise control over the patterns of data on your drives and ultimately the copies in your brain.  You see, taken to the logical extreme, to prevent a user from reproducing data you would need some kind of thought police, some kind of enforcement program to bore inside each brain, to prevent the various neurons, axons and dendrils from copying and storing the information in the lobes (a scenario that Charles Stross explores in his novels).  Or in otherwords, IP itself is a form of steampunk malware — imagined in the Age of Sail to protect existing business models and special interests by granting intellectual monopolies which would not exist in a free-market and are only enforceable via coercion (e.g., the state).

Part II

A friend of a friend of mine recently sent me some troubling information (that has been reproduced perfectly bit-by-bit — without any harm or destruction done to the original copy).  According to this contact, Robert Wenzel may have massaged part of a talk he gave at the Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Below is a transcript from Wenzel’s talk at the LVMI last month.  Here is what Wenzel said in the speech (see 28 minutes in) — An Examination of Key Factors in the Collapse of the Soviet Union:

“If a peasant handed over his surplus grain, the state would get what it wanted. Any who did not were labelled ‘kulaks’ and, therefore, were ‘enemies of the state’ and suitably punished – along with their grain being confiscated.

“He ordered ‘the destruction of kulaks as a class.’ . . . No one was quite sure, though, what was a ‘kulak’ and no one wanted to ask Stalin. . . .

“The kulaks were divided into three groups. . . [These were the groups]: those to be killed immediately, those to be sent to prison and those to be deported to Siberia or Russian Asia. The third category alone consisted of about 150,000 households, one million people. Stalin believed that such a brutal policy would persuade others in agricultural regions to accept the rule of Moscow and that resistance would end. Stalin wrote to [his aides] “We must break the back of the peasantry.”

Compare Wenzel’s passage to this excerpt from an online encyclopedia article, The Great Famine:

“If a peasant handed over his surplus grain, the state would get what it wanted. Any who did not were labelled ‘kulaks’ and, therefore, were ‘enemies of the state’ and suitably punished – along with their grain being confiscated.

“He ordered ‘the destruction of the kulaks as a class.’ No one was quite sure as to what determined a ‘kulak’ but no one in Moscow was willing to raise this issue with Stalin.

“The kulaks were divided into three groups. . . : those to be killed immediately, those to be sent to prison and those to be deported to Siberia or Russian Asia. The third category alone consisted of about 150,000 households, one million people. Stalin believed that such a brutal policy would persuade others in agricultural regions to accept the rule of Moscow and that resistance would end. Stalin wrote to Molotov, “We must break the back of the peasantry.”

Yet Robert holds firm positions on plagiarism elsewhere.  This next statement is copied and pasted, without the destruction or harm of the original information from Robert regarding Stefan Molyneux:

“That a plagiarist like Molyneux can simply grab another person’s writing and give the impression that it is his original writing, in my view, it is a sleazy move and theft.”

While his whole talk is long block quotes from cited sources, why did he lift this without attribution from an encyclopedia narrative?  Why is copying and reproducing okay to do in that circumstance, but not in others (e.g., copying a music file or movie)?

A similar instance occurred during a recent debate between Wenzel and a patent attorney in which Wenzel restated the definition of multivariable calculus word for word, without citing the source (Wikipedia).

Part III

A year ago, Robert claimed he spoke “at the invitation of the New York Federal Reserve Bank.”  At the time he claimed to have read these prepared marks at the NY Fed.  Yet the stark reality is that he only spoke to two other people at the Fed, including the acquaintance who invited him to lunch.  He has thus misled everyone by making it seem it was some kind of keynote speech:

This was not a “speech” at the in sense that Robert Wenzel was holding forth in front of large room full of Federal Reserve policy makers and analysts. I spoke with Richard Peach at the New York Fed: the “speech” was just Robert Wenzel having lunch in the dining room with two people — Richard Peach and one colleague — during which Wenzel read his speech to the two of them over lunch. This was not Netanyahu at the UN.

Wenzel’s claim is misleading, it is disingenuous.  I frequently walk nearby various CPC (Communist Party of China) buildings throughout the year.  I have even talked about free-market ideas with a couple of my Chinese friends near those buildings.  Yet it would be false of me to claim that I “spoke” at the CPC or that I gave a speech to Party officials.

Which brings us back to the Drudge formula.  Like all SEO, there is no ironclad mathematical formula to get on Drudge.  Hyperbolic headlines, purported insider scoops, specific keywords and posting first — are all part and parcel to the SEO/SEM industry.  That is how link-baiting sites like Business Insider and HuffingtonPost work.  Yet no matter who buys/copies/transfers the purported formula, the original remains as unharmed as the day it was first assimilated — no information was destroyed or stolen.  However Robert, like all people who communicate and convey information, must now compete with others who have observed and procured a non-scarce entity.

Part IV – unmasking the sock puppet

So who is this Robert Wenzel character (rw@economicpolicyjournal.com)?

  • There used to be a site called EconomicPolicyReview.com (2007-2008) run by Raymond Salter (rs@economicpolicyreview.com).  Here is a 2007 copy from TheWayBackMachine.  He wrote near identical copy to EPJ today.  The Phil Gramm post on EPJ (careful IP!) is identical to the one on EPR (same date even).  Here is a SS.
  • Prior to that was another similar site called EconomicsDaily run by Raymond Fuller (raymond.fuller@economicsdaily.com), here is a 2005 copy from TheWayBackMachine.  During this time, Fuller even was involved in a spat with Gene Callahan (who used to be affiliated with the LVMI).  Fuller also wrote similar copy and content as EPJ today.
  • From 2002-2005 another site, Menrohm.com was maintained by Robert Menrhom (rm@menrohm.com), here is a 2005 copy which discusses some of the same topics (Freakonomics) and quoting libertarians like Justin Raimondo.
  • In 2006 a Peter Stojan piece (SS) at LRC cites Raymond Keller (not Fuller) as a source of commentary.  Stojan’s company (montreauxadvisors.com) does not exist.  A 2006 copy of Raymond Keller’s site is up on TheWayBackMachine and Keller’s Blogger profile is expired but turns into (SS) Raymond Salter’s.  Keller also wrote about economics (Freakonomics) and talks about his letters to the late LRC publisher, Burt Blumert.

While it would be fallacious to connect those dots (guilt by association) consider the case of Los Angeles resident Raymond Nize, owner of Beacon Hill West and Nize Holdings.

In 2006 there was press release issued (SS) on behalf of Raymond Nize a supposed expert in economic forecasting who would be speaking at a World Economics Forecast Conference.  The conference did not exist nor was the book by the title that Nize supposedly wrote ever published (“Understanding Macro-Economic Forecasting: A guide for Business Executives and Investors”).  This same Nize may be the same poster at LVMI (see here and here and here).  If it is the same Nize (nize@nizenotes.com), then TheWayBackMachine also has a 2006 copy of yet another Blogger site that once again is written in similar style/copy as EPJ (e.g., macro economics).  Nize also commented on this post (SS) about re-finance mortgages in California but later removed his last name.  Nize’s other Blogger profile (SS) leads to a dead end pointing to a non-existent site about the 213 area code of LA — a common theme through many of these domains and aliases is they are usually affiliated with LA.  Looking through Technorati a site originally dedicated to indexing and searching blogs), Nizenotes is claimed (SS) by a mont99.  One mont99 (located in LA — room730@gmail.com) also has a profile (SS) at LibraryThing that includes favorites along the same genres/topics of all the other blogs thus far (libertarianism/Austrianism).  (Note: this mont99 is probably a different room730.)

All of these sites have very similar look, feel and commentary to EconomicPolicyJournal.com and a few posts that are on all of the sites (with small changes) plus EPR also shows history going back to 2002 while it was really created in 2007.  It is very likely that the same person is behind all of the Blogger sites but nothing besides the spartan aesthetic looks, content genre (all libertarian/econ), content layout (short blurbs/block quotes) and email addresses (similar style) confirms that.  EPR seem to have been picked up in 2009 by other people and then dropped again, the domain is unowned at the moment.

The smoking gun however, is a lawsuit filed (SS) on January 14, 2008 where Ray was named as a defendant in a case filed in California: La Jolla Cove Investors, Inc vs Stomar Partners, Inc, Jim Miller, Raymond Nize and Does 1-10 (case no: 37-2007-000642640CU-BC-CTL).  While I cannot weigh on the merits of the case (the plaintiff’s site is just one side of things… install Quicktime/IE for his 2nd monologue here), the plaintiff was apparently friends with Ray and his ex-gf.  Here is a picture (SS) of Ray with the plaintiff (also seen at the top of this post).  Compare that with his alias (Robert Wenzel’s) video from the LVMI speech last month (see side-by-side comparison at the bottom).  Furthermore, if you do a WhoIs database search on EconomicPolicyJournal.com, it is registered to EPJ Holdings — to a Los Angeles address (5042 Wilshire Blvd) and the registered phone number (213-2593-55XX) is an area code for LA as well (SS).

Possible known aliases:

  • Raymond Nize
  • Raymond Sabat
  • Robert Menrohm
  • Raymond Fuller
  • Raymond Keller
  • Peter Stojan
  • Raymond Salter
  • Robert Wenzel
  • Robert Wallach (see update 1)
  • Raymond Walkosz (see update 3)
  • Paul Trombley

According to a friend of a friend who tipped me off on this, he suspects that there are many more aliases out there.  I think it is more likely than not that Robert Wenzel is not his original name and probably even not his actual current name.  And it seems like EPJ was his biggest success story so he stuck with that name because of that.  Furthermore, it is hard to verify his claims of working at a hedge fund or in Wall Street itself let alone corroborate his purported predictions of booms and busts like the 2008 financial crash when he seems to have a history of backdating posts.

And while I personally have no qualms with people reinventing themselves or even leading multiple lives this entire escapade is beginning to look more and more like the Libertarian Girl hoax (see here and here) with a dash of bravado from Catch Me If You Can, a dab of whodunnit from The Usual Suspects and a smattering of interconnected cast members from Cloud Atlas.

Is Robert Wenzel/Raymond Nize the modern-day Keyser Söze?  Or is he a mere internet sockpuppet?

Update 1: another source just emailed the following information, there are two more similar sites.  EconomicBriefing.com (copy at TWBM and SS) and EconomicsBriefing.com (copy at TWBM and SS). The last one was active 2005 and 2007, with two different authors.  All linked to the alias, Raymond Sabat and a new one, Robert Wallach (rw@economicsbriefing.com).  The latter has the same Blogger layout and the former is an already known alias.  Both cover the same genre/topics and writing format as the other Wenzel/Nize aliases.

Update 2: Over the night (or during the day depending on your time zone) there have been a few other sightings/uncoverings.  It turns out a few years ago Bob Murphy accidentally uncovered one alias (Raymond Sabat) and didn’t know it at the time.  At the time, Wenzel/Nize outs the same persona (SS), calling it a “pen name” that he used due to “other business commitments.”  Another Raymond Nize sighting was discovered in 2006 at Econlib, in a comment discussing LA.  Robert Wallach (the new alias mentioned in the first update) was found to have published a piece over LRC (SS).

Update 3: Two weeks later a new source sent me new information regarding another Wenzel/Nize alias that was involved in penny stock scheme of a company called IVAY (Investigative Services Agencies).   At one point IVAY promoters used a notorious “pump & dump” message board (Investor Hub) — which was heavily active during February – March of 2007 during a price rise of over 100 percent .07 to .26 (see several hundred posts here).  Users stevo51 and creede claims to have spoken to Ray several times during this period: 1 2 3 4.  This company produced a number of PR notices claiming that “we [IVAY] anticipate hiring more than 400 new employees and a multimillion-dollar increase in revenues over the term of this contract.”  PR news source: 1 2 3  Keep in mind the company had $6,425 in cash as of December 31, 2006. The stock then got suspended March 8, 2007 as part of an SEC crackdown of 35 companies that were accused of manipulation and failing to disclose material information to the public.  According to the Rip Off Report complaint a police report was filed May 5 because of theft.  This IVAY firm involves yet another Nize/Wenzel alias, named Raymond Walkosz (rw@stomarpartners.com) who was the “president and founder of the financial public relations and investor relations firm Stomar Partners. Walkosz has represented companies trading on the American Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, the OTC Bulletin Board and the Pink Sheets.”  According to DeletedDomains (which tracks domain expirations), stomarpartners.com was vacated on March 10, 2006 and is empty today.   This same IVAY issued a press release listing 100 VIPs invited to a Beverly Hills gala; Raymond Nize was a named guest.  This same Nize may be the creator of an inactive LinkedIn profile (SS) which lists his residence as LA and industry as entertainment.  In addition, the case noted above (# 37-2007-00064264-CU-BC-CT), the outcome was judgment by default — the plantiff was awarded $95,439.95 damages and $10,809.55 prejudgment interest at 9.75%.  This case involved a stock sale agreement between the parties (Nize/Wenzel was a defendant).  In 2005, this same Raymond Walkosz alias published at least one more PR release, this time promoting another seemingly phantom company called Worldwide Manufacturing USA (website) that is another penny stock (OTCBB:WMFG), yet it does not seem as if the company produces or sold anything and its CEO, Jimmy Wang, has been thus far unlocatable.   See more details at the Acceleritas thread and at the Mises community forum.

Update 4: This blog has received trollish comments from a “Paul Trombley” (paul.trombley@yahoo.com).  A bit of cursory googling reveals that this same “Paul” has similar interests as Nize/Wenzel and even quotes Nize/Wenzel in various threads on sites like Mises.org.  See this post longer post here.

Robert Wenzel, Ray Nize, Marine

Robert Wenzel, Ray Nize (middle), and an anonymous Marine

 

 

The ADB on China: This Time Is Different

[Note: below is a guest post from Mark DeWeaver]

The Asian Development Bank has just published its Asian Development Outlook for 2013.  Turning to the “Economic Prospects” section for China (on p. 157 of the report), we find that the ADB is expecting GDP growth of 8.2% for this year, up from 7.8% in 2012.  Next year, however, growth is expected to fall to 8.0% as the new leadership replaces the “previous pursuit of fast-track growth” with a new approach focusing on the “quality, efficiency, and the sustainability of economic growth”

While I agree that faster growth is likely this year, I don’t see a new approach to economic development leading to a slowdown in 2014.  There are two things wrong with this idea:

First, there is nothing new about the “new approach.”   Every five-year plan (FYP) since the Sixth, which ran from 1981-1985, has stressed the importance of transitioning to a more efficient “mode of growth.” Consider the following history of official statements on this issue (all taken from various issues of the Zhongguo Jingji Nianjian [Almanac of the Chinese Economy]):

In 1982, then-Premier Zhao Ziyang told the National People’s Congress that “raising economic efficiency” was to be the “center of all economic work” during the period of the Sixth FYP.

In 1985, describing the Seventh FYP, Zhao told the National Party Congress that “we must not one-sidedly pursue excessively high economic growth rates.”

In 1991, Zhao’s successor Li Peng told the National People’s Congress (NPC) that the Eighth Plan not only had “clear requirements for the speed and quantity of growth,” but “an even greater emphasis on raising the quality of economic growth.”

In a 1996 speech to the NPC on the Ninth Plan, Li called for “actively advancing the economic structure” and “the fundamental transformation of the mode of economic growth.”

Zhu Rongji, Li’s successor as premier, put the case even more emphatically at the March 2001 National People’s Congress. During the period of the Tenth Plan, structural adjustment would be the “main line.” China had, Zhu said, “already reached a point at which further development would be impossible without adjustment.”

In 2007, Hu Jintao told the National Party Congress that during the Eleventh Plan period China would transition to “scientific development,” which he defined as development that is “comprehensive, balanced, and sustainable.”

As it turns out, economic efficiency has been a central government priority since the early 1980s.  Yet progress in this area has been elusive.  The share of investment in GDP continues to grow at the expense of household consumption even as income inequality becomes ever more severe.

The second problem with the ADB’s 2014 forecast is the fact that local officials’ “investment enthusiasm” (as the Chinese call it) is always strongest immediately after Communist Party congresses.  Many officials get new assignments around the time of these meetings, which are held every five years.  Generally they want to start new projects right away, in order to ensure that as much of the resulting GDP growth as possible will occur while they are in office.

The five-year peak-to-peak period of the typical Chinese investment cycle is thus closely linked to the timing of Party congresses.  All six of the investment cycle tops that have occurred since 1977 happened within the first two years following a congress.  And every congress except the 1997 15th Congress has been followed by a top within the following two years.  (See Chapter 4 of my new book, Animal Spirits with Chinese Characteristics, for a detailed history of the Chinese investment cycle.)

Given that a Party congress was held at the end of last year, this suggests that investment growth is unlikely to slow in the second half of this year as the ADB is expecting.

The ADB believes that this time will be different because of the leadership’s “new approach.”  But given that this new approach is already over 30 years old, it’s hard to see why a transition to a new “mode of growth” should now be the basis for anyone’s baseline forecast for the Chinese economy.

Mark DeWeaver manages the emerging markets fund Quantrarian Asia Hedge and is the author of Animal Spirits with Chinese Characteristics: Booms and Busts in the World’s Emerging Economic Giant.

How to use Bitcoin

Had lunch with a couple of friends today and the topic turned to Bitcoins (BTC).  If you’re unfamiliar with this digital currency in addition to the obligatory wiki entry, I recommend reading Are Bitcoins The Future? from Priceonomics.

If you are interested in actually mining for new BTC I would suggest holding off, unless you own a supercomputer connected to a solar powered grid.  The reason why is that until recently it actually cost more in terms of electricity than you actually made in mining new coins.  See Bitcoin Mining Update: Power Usage Costs Across the United States (this analysis was done in July 2011 so rates are different now.)

If you are looking to buy/sell BTC I recommend creating an account at Mt. Gox which is the biggest BTC exchange globally as well as Dwolla which makes it very easy to move money from you bank account into it and get BTC from exchanges like Mt. Gox.  Once you have some BTC you need to move them into a wallet, one of the most popular is BlockChain.

And if you plan on drinking in NYC there is now a bar that accepts BTC.

Update: Meet the $2 Million Bitcoin Pizza from Hit & Run

Chapter 1 – Potential market size

[Note: below is Chapter 1 from Great Wall of Numbers]

Should you and your company come to China?

There is no simple clear-cut answer for everyone.  As you will find out, each market segment is different from the next.  Each faces a wide variety of domestic competition and regulatory hurdles.  Throughout each chapter I attempt to do cursory due diligence by looking at current market statistics and use anecdotal stories to illustrate both the opportunities and challenges of setting up shop on the mainland.  Along the way you will hear the experiences and opinions from a number of experts through a variety of tapped and untapped revenue sources.

For example, Jim Chanos, founder of Kynikos Associates, is a New-York based hedge fund manager and short seller.  Among other cautionary tales, over the past several years he has repeated one particular story about China.  A story of two American men, who spoke Chinese, made the right connections, did their due diligence and yet barely got out of China with their shirts still on.1

His is a shrewd and important tale – a twist of caveat venditor.  And despite their acumen this kind of harrowing story can arguably happen anywhere.  Moreover just like the US muddled on despite the 2008 financial purges and Ponzi schemes such as Bernie Madoff’s, so too will China lumber on irrespective of its booms, busts, frauds and scandals.  This is not to say there will not be large purges of misallocated, unproductive assets.  As Ludwig von Mises might have said, a priori you can never buck market calculation and market corrections.2  Yet this is not to say the Chinese industrialization story will collapse or meltdown either.

A potential market for revenue generation

With more than 1.35 billion people, China is the most populous country in the world and will remain so for at least another 15 years.3

Yet just because there is a large potential market does not mean you can magically sell a $1 cup of coffee to everyone and instantly become nouveau rich.  Or as one of my sarcastic students told me years ago: in China, if you scam everyone in the country just once, you can become a billionaire.  More to the point, as Matt Garner discusses in his forthcoming book on marketing in China, the domestic home shopping industry has been filled with these types of cons and frauds (e.g., buying a gold brick – as seen on TV – yet receiving a flimsy cardboard cut-out in the mail).4 And as I discuss later in Chapter 3, consumers are becoming increasingly savvy and vigilant to such get-rich-quick scams.

So how big is the actual market for goods and services?  Following Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” in late 1978, GDP has grown from approximately $10 billion to over $8 trillion.  At the same time, one estimate shows that consumer spending as a percent of GDP has fallen from 50% to just under 35% over the past 15 years; yet a newly revised government report suggests the number may be much higher at 55% and another estimate is even higher at 65%.5 Either way, there are still growth opportunities if you know where to look and are willing to take risks.  After all, 35% of $8 trillion is still much larger than 65% of $1 trillion let alone $10 billion.

What does this mean for Western companies, your company?  The US is the 2nd largest exporter and according to the Economics & Statistics Administration exports reached a record $2.1 trillion in 2011.6  In fact, according to BusinessWeek and Bureau of Economic Analysis, September 2012 was another record month for exports, hitting $187 billion.7 Overall exports rose an additional 4.4% in 2012.8 Yet despite the fact that as of 2012, roughly 95.5% of all potential customers (e.g., world population sans the US) and 67% of all purchasing power reside outside of the US, relatively few US firms currently export.9

Moreover, as I discuss later in Chapter 7 according to the US Department of Commerce, as of 2010 in terms of US Small & Medium Enterprises (SME):10

  • Only 1% of US SMEs export
  • And only 10% of those that export, export to China

There are a number of reasons for relatively low participation including nebulous legal frameworks.  But it is also surprising because despite the readily accessible markets made available due to standardized shipping container sizes, liberalized trade agreements, ISO certifications resulting in ‘best practices’ and overall streamlining of supply chains, merchants across the globe – and in the US – have never had it easier than today.11

Yet if you are reading this, odds are your company does not export either.  In fact, depending on the source, up to 95% of US firms simply do not even have an international market strategy.

More to the point, on top of the approximately 30,000 SMEs that do export to China, typically only the top 500 US firms generate significant sales outside of the US.  Why do you and your company not export?  As you will find out, your brand is probably considered a step-above locally made goods and services.  In fact, as I note later in Chapter 4 and Chapter 11, luxury goods and services are one increasingly large source of income for US firms like Howard Johnson hotels and Coach handbags – both of whom have taken advantage of the local market perception that “foreign” is better quality.  Similarly, in Chapter 16 I also discuss how fast-food chains like KFC and Starbucks use a number of logistical and perception strategies and now generate more revenue in China than anywhere outside the US.  Can your company do the same?

In December 2012 I spoke with Kirt Greenburg, then-director of the SME center at the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai.12 According to Greenburg, “one of the reasons that there are statistically few SMEs that export is because the US has such a large domestic market capable of sustaining a large pool of local competitors fueled solely by domestic trade thus US SMEs can usually grow quite large just by focusing on North America.  And coupled with obstacles such as known regulations and fears of unknown hurdles, this has prevented many SMEs from looking at ways to export.  Yet there are enormous opportunities in China as it is still a large growth market.”

There are also a large number of resources and support networks.  For instance, “there are several SME centers at other Chambers including the EU and New Zealand that provide open research, business connections and even resources to aggregate and leverage databases from both governments and NGOs.  For example, the SBA program offers a $10,000 grant to US SMEs to ‘go and explore’ in China.  Yet few people, including myself until recently, even knew this type of program exists.  Many SME centers, including ours, also includes both manpower and physical space to help enable entrepreneurs and businesspeople to utilize our knowledge and business connections throughout the day.  In fact, our SME center really could be described as a marketplace for ‘best practices’ and ideas in general.”  Later in Chapter 15 and 20 I detail some of the other subsidies and perks that some Chinese municipalities and trade zones offer to foreign firms, specifically software and engineering companies.

In terms of why there is a relatively low percentage of SMEs that export, Greenburg noted that, “anecdotally it can be a laborious task to find domestic partners, domestic customers and domestic vendors that you can immediately trust on the mainland.  Vetting a partner can take a long time because there is no Better Business Report or D&B report.  Yet through the Foreign Commercial Service, this task may become relatively easier in the future.  Furthermore, one of the reasons why there may only be 1% of SMEs that export in general is that there are a large amount of SMEs in the US and other countries that do not have an easily exportable service, such as one-on-one consultations at dentist offices, barbershops or music lessons.”13

This absence of independent business monitoring may present an opportunity for foreign firms that specialize in business forensics and customer reporting to provide similar services on the mainland.

This is not to say that in a role reversal, exporting products to the US is any easier.  For example, Greenburg thinks “regulations for foreign firms exporting to the US would probably be just as problematic in some cases as they are in China.  Furthermore, most commerce in the US is actually conducted at the state-level, which requires additional legal knowledge just as it does at the provincial level in China.  Yet, one of the issues that SMEs – both foreign and domestic – have to take into consideration on the mainland is the grey regulations that vary from city to city.  Whereas there is an income tax levied by the federal government on all US citizens regardless of location, in China, municipalities have considerable leeway and flexibility to implement national laws.  For example, last year a new social security tax on foreign workers was passed at the national level in Beijing, yet the Shanghai municipality and many others have not begun levying the tax yet.”  On a national level this specific law went into effect on October 15, 2011; I discuss tax issues later in Chapter 10.14

Market access

According to the US Department of Commerce, 91% of world GDP (sans the US) is generated by countries with whom the US does not currently have a Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with, yet FTA countries alone represent 41% of total US exports.15 While there is currently no China-US free trade agreement, there have been numerous bilateral agreements reducing trade duties and restrictions.1617 Furthermore, US firms have invested more FDI into China than any other developing country this decade and the two countries (sometimes referred to as Chimerica or G2), with $446.7 billion in bilateral trade in 2011, are among each other’s largest trading partners.18

After Canada and Mexico, China is the 3rd largest destination for US exports.  In 2011, US exports to China hit a new record of $105.3 billion.  Among the largest products that US firms collectively exported were agricultural, as I discuss later in Chapter 3 (in 2011, China imported $20 billion in US agricultural products).  And due to the domestic demand for safe and reliable products, Chinese consumers are increasingly turning to imported products (also discussed in Chapter 3).  Thus even if you have not looked at the market, there are still untapped opportunities on the mainland, including sports consulting (Chapter 8), software development (Chapter 13) and entertainment (Chapter 14).

Big hurdles

Towards the end of the book I describe at length some of the bigger macro hurdles that foreign and domestic firms will face on the mainland.  There are specific industries that will be more difficult to operate in than others.  For example, at a national level Chinese policy makers consider roughly a dozen areas to be key strategic industries.19

This includes Energy, Media, Telecommunications, Railways and Finance.  As a consequence the national government attempts to foster and nurture domestic firms at the expense of international and foreign competition.  All told there are roughly 110,000 to 150,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) supported and managed by townships, cities, provinces and nationally within China (down from 1.2 million in 1995).2021 They contribute to roughly 62% of the annual GDP.22

In addition, roughly 100 SOEs such as China Mobile, Xinhua and Sinopec are afforded the equivalent of VIP status, granted financial priorities and regulatory leeway.

Yet even within these government champions are opportunities for outside, international participation.  While most Fortune 500 multi-national companies have permanently established a presence on the mainland, there is still ample room for foreign SME’s and consulting firms to participate in a bevy of other industries such as education, social media, athletics and even in government procurement.  In fact, in 2011, government procurement amounted to about $179 billion.23 And following a series of reforms, foreign firms are now permitted to bid on government procurement projects.  With that said, China is currently not a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).24

So if you are a bidder in a procurement project, be cognizant and aware that you will be unable to make a case and petition the WTO in the event that issues arise.25

With a $8.28 trillion economy, despite a seemingly Byzantine regulatory climate, capturing even a small portion of market share means there may be opportunities and rewards for those creative and enterprising enough to locate them.26 As I note later in Chapter 5 and Chapter 10, policy uncertainties and hurdles will create challenges for both foreign and domestic companies.

For example, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) – the equivalent of the SEC – routinely compels a dozen or more SOEs to prop up the stock market, to prevent the Shanghai stock index from falling below 2000; which it momentarily did for the first time in four years in November 2012.2728 While this revelation is neither new nor proprietary it creates a dilemma for investors who are “more concerned with the decisions of regulators than the valuation of companies.”29 This would be akin to refocusing on (and lobbying) referees at a sport event rather than the actual game.

Another requirement for nearly all imported goods is obtaining the CCC or China Compulsory Certificate.  This mandatory CCC mark, which typically takes 4-8 months to receive, is administered by the Certificate and Accreditation Administration, which maintains a list of products that are required to meet this certification process.3031 Failure to obtain and complete the application ends with a denial of market entry.  Another issue is proper labeling and packaging.  For example, beginning April 2013, all imported medical devices will be required to have packages and labels written in Chinese.  Failure to do so will again prevent the manufacturer and sponsor from being able to market their products on the mainland.32

Taxes and duties are another issue that is sometimes overlooked.  The General Administration of Customs (海关总署) periodically revises a list of products and their corresponding tariff rates.  For example, as of April 15, 2012, while some goods are taxed at 10% (e.g., food, beverages, leather garments, furniture), others are levied up to 50% (e.g., cosmetics, tobacco, alcoholic beverages) and still others such as luxury goods are charged a 60% tax rate.33 In some cases if you import goods worth less than 5,000 yuan ($800) then you may not have to pay a tax on them.34 One personal anecdote involves sending jewelry (gold and diamonds) from the US to China via FedEx in December 2011.  The jewelry was held up in customs at Shanghai’s Pudong airport because of import restrictions; I was required to pay a duty tax due to its value exceeding the 5,000 yuan limit.  And as I note later in Chapter 11, it is these types of taxes which incentivize Chinese consumers to travel overseas to buy goods which can then be claimed as “personal belongings” upon return, thus removing tax liabilities and saving money.  There are also 15 special economic zones (经济特区) also called free-trade zones that are allowed to set their own import regulations and duties and as a consequence are relatively popular for establishing joint-ventures and foreign trade operations.3536 In addition to areas such as Shanghai’s Waigaoqiao and Ningbo’s free trade area, these zones also include the special administrative regions (SAR) of Hong Kong and Macau and are credited for the subsequent economic booms in each of the mainly coastal cities.

Another nebulous challenge which varies from location to location is transaction costs involving government and quasi-governmental support and approval.37 In some industries in order to start-up a business you may not only have to acquire businesses licenses but also directly work with governmental bodies to set up operations.  In some instances you may even need to have a government policy and market policy, or in other words, you need to have resources and labor to interface with policy makers as well as with market participants.  There is no set generalized rule about these transaction costs and thus discussing these issues with a lawyer is highly recommended since the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and UK Bribery Act are both actively enforced (see Chapter 10).

Yet despite all of these known hurdles (more of which are discussed in later chapters), and what your due diligence may discover, there still may be a profitable case for doing business on the mainland.  Failure to do so, your firm could follow the unfortunate footsteps of Caterpillar, who recently took a $580 million write-down at a subsidiary that acquired a Hong Kong listed firm (ERA Mining) off an acquisition price of $654 million.3839

Yet for perspective, China is the world’s largest car market, the largest motorcycle market, the largest smartphone market, the largest art selling market, the largest online game market, the largest population of online shoppers and even the largest gambling market.40 How large are these potential markets?  For instance, in 2009, China surpassed the US as the largest vehicle market globally and approximately 19.3 million automobiles were sold in China in 2012.41 By 2015 it is estimated that the Chinese car market will be larger than the US, Japan and Germany combined.424344 And by 2016, McKinsey & Company – a global management consulting company – estimates that China will surpass the US as top luxury car market.45 There are now 240 million vehicles on the mainland and 20 million more vehicles will be sold this year.46 Furthermore, according to Michael Dunne, an Asian-based car market consultant, “[of] the projected 2.3 million American-branded cars Chinese will buy this year [2012], an astonishing 96% will be made in China.”47 And this growth rate has largely occurred in less than a decade.  For example, in 2004, the market for Land Rover vehicles on the mainland was a mere 1% yet has subsequently surged to 20% of Land Rovers total sales last year.4849 There have been similar growth rates in other areas.  For instance, with 290 million smartphone owners, this market itself is expected to double in size within the next year.50 Can you provide goods and services within these segments?

Local fluctuations

One term you may see throughout the book is the yuan (renminbi or RMB) which is the name of the currency in China.  As of March 2013 approximately 6.22 RMB was equal to $1 USD.  How often does this fluctuate?  In the first half of 2012 it depreciated by almost 1.5% but in October 2012 it gained back .75%.  While all major currencies in the Post-Bretton Woods monetary system fluctuate relative to one another, the key takeaway is that the RMB itself is not free-floating.51 It is managed on a band peg set daily by the People’s Bank of China (e.g., the central bank pegs the rate each day and the currency can move up to 1% in either direction).52

What are the average annual salaries of Chinese residents?  As I noted later in Chapter 15, according to 2011 official figures, the per capita disposable income for rural residents was $1,100 and their urban counterparts was $3,430.535455 But there is also a significantly large outlier at the top-end, according to Hurun’s 2012 list of richest people in China there are now more than a million USD millionaires on the mainland, a number that is estimated to increase to 1.9 million by 2015.5657  And according to a recent Boston Consulting Group study, the number of affluent Chinese (those with disposable incomes of at least $20,000 to $1 million) will double from the current 120 million to 280 million by 2020.58 While these numbers will probably fluctuate and may even dip due to fallout from real-estate bubbles, this suggests that there are potential customers at various price points your company is looking to sell at.

I should also point out that I purposefully avoided analyzing most industries that are nationalized as well as those directly affected by the recent investment business cycle, specifically residential real-estate and commodity exchanges.

Gaining and trading guanxi

While I mention it in passing several times, guanxi (关系) is a unique cultural phenomenon involving personal connections and trust networks and I think Matt Garner describes the phenomenon most concisely for Western audiences:

[Guanxi is] one of the big cultural disconnects I would always see between American and Chinese business people. Americans are results oriented. But Chinese are relationship oriented.  When the Americans come they have a specific set of objectives to meet.  They come to the table with those goals and hope to meet them in a few days.  Asians, on the other hand, typically want to first make the relationship.  It’s like a marriage arrangement. You want both sides to know and trust each other first.  This is especially true in China since contract enforcement mechanisms in most of the country are still developing, thus making trust and mutual respect mission critical.  A first round negotiation is more of a meet and greet than anything that gets tangible results.59

While building rapport and trust is important for all long-term business relationships in any country, guanxi is a unique cultural trait that is established first before any business transaction is carried out.  Moreover, such a relationship (guanxi) can only be built and reinforced over time through repeated virtuous performance, and not easily given to quick introductions and a handshake (as is the practice in the West).  Hence the seemingly endless rounds of elaborate dinners, karaoke nights and mahjong sessions to establish and maintain guanxi.  For example, Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG) is an American company that operates the Staples Arena in Los Angeles and the Mercedes-Benz Arena in Pudong, Shanghai.  As part of their long-term expansion plan they have hired local salespersons and managers to build guanxi and relationships with local suppliers and officials.  In doing so, they can cement mutual trust among all stakeholders and provide a communication channel for all future business.  In addition it is an expandable resource as whomever you have established guanxi with can now introduce you to their own trust networks and connections.

Is this merely the exception rather than the rule?  No.  For LinkedIn, out of its 200 million global userbase, only 1% comes from China.  Why?  Professor Wei Wuhui of Jiaotong University opines that, “I don’t think the Chinese middle class has the same needs in terms of professional networks as people in the West, because of the concept of guanxi.  In China people do not want to meet with people they don’t know. The Chinese have a culture based on relationships among family members and close friends.”60 Thus do not necessarily count on using Western networking methods to procure and build contacts – or as the expression goes, when in Rome.

And as Larry Chang, Charles Zeng and other entrepreneurs point out in interviews later on, one of the biggest challenges for any foreign firm is initially building these social connections, these trust networks that every Chinese businessperson and consumer has.  Yet overcoming this cultural challenge is a struggle for anyone even mainland residents.  As the saying attributed to Joseph P. Kennedy and Knute Rockne notes, “when the going gets tough, the tough get going.”  If becoming a successful entrepreneur was easy, we would all be fùwēng (富翁).

Takeaway: With the 2nd largest economy and an increasing demand for foreign-made products and services, China may be a new source for customers and revenue generation.  As detailed in the following chapters each industry has differing market access characteristics.  Furthermore, there are a variety of ways to sell your products directly to Chinese consumers, even without physically opening an office on the mainland (see ExportNow in Chapter 7).  Yet there are any number of policy and domestic hurdles that may present challenges to all foreign companies – challenges that as I repeatedly stress throughout the book require you to do your due diligence before making any substantial investments.  Furthermore, how you attract brand awareness, generate leads and manage customer relationships are tactical decisions that will vary according to industry – some of which are detailed in the following chapters.


Endnotes:

  1. The name of the book is Mr. China: A Memoir by Tim Cissold. During his April 12, 2010 show, Charlie Rose interviewed Jim Chanos, Chanos briefly discussed the story:

    “There’s been a couple wonderful books, including one called “Mr. China” about two investment bankers who set up shop right after Tiananmen Square. They spoke Mandarin, they were connected. They hired the kids of the high party officials. And they couldn’t have gotten it more right from a big-picture point of view. And they wrote this book a number of years later on how they were lucky to get out with their skin. They were completely bankrupted by China.” []

  2. Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth by Ludwig von Mises []
  3. Due to the one-child policy and outward immigration, according to UN demographers, ceteris paribus China will hit a peak population within the next 20 years.  India will likely eclipse China during this time frame in large part because its birth rate remains above the 2.1 replacement mark.  In contrast, China’s birthrate is effectively 1.47 per mother.  This is further discussed in Chapter 18.  See also Birth rule could be relaxed from China Daily, Peak toil from The Economist and One-child policy shift won’t usher in China baby boom from Reuters []
  4. Red Flags: My Years in a Chinese Company by Matt Garner (forthcoming)  []
  5. See China’s Golden Rule of Consumption by Yukon Huang and China unlocks right kind of growth from Financial Times and Chinese shoppers are thriving from Financial Times []
  6. U.S. Exports Top Historic High of $2.1 Trillion, Support 9.7 Million Jobs from the Economics & Statistics Administration []
  7. See Record Overseas Sales Boost U.S. Growth from BusinessWeek and U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services from the Bureau of Economic Analysis []
  8. Surprise! U.S. economy likely grew in fourth quarter from Reuters []
  9. Another reason to export is that the long-term potential for emerging market annual consumption is expected to reach $30 trillion by 2025.  See Winning the $30 trillion decathlon: Going for gold in emerging markets from McKinsey Quarterly []
  10. Opportunities for U.S. Small and Medium Business in the China Market from the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai []
  11. The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger from Marc Levinson []
  12. American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai SME Center []
  13. See Better Business Bureau, Dun & Bradstreet, US Commercial Service and the 2012 US Commercial Service report: Powering Export Growth []
  14. Foreigners Set For Social Benefits from Shanghai Daily []
  15. Free Trade Agreements from the International Trade Administration []
  16. US lawmaker urges investment treaty pact with China from Reuters []
  17. This is not an endorsement that the WTO and managed trade agreements are supposedly the manifestation and embodiment of pure free-trade.  Yet some trade is better than no trade.  Or as Frédéric Bastiat purportedly said, if merchants and goods do not cross borders, armies will.  Yet due to relatively freer trade channels, merchants (especially in the West) have access to more potential trade channels than at any time in history.  See Who Said It? by Don Boudreaux and Biography of Frederic Bastiat by Thomas DiLorenzo []
  18. According to Eric Jay Dolin’s new book When America First Met China, this trade-based relationship goes back 225 years.  See How the China Trade Helped Make America from The Daily Beast, China’s 2011 foreign trade surges 22.5% from China Daily, Statistical Communiqué on the 2011 National Economic and Social Development from National Bureau of Statistics of China []
  19. Historically these “heavy” or “key industries” are called the commanding heights, a term that was first coined by Vladimir Lenin during the first years of the Soviet Union.  See The Commanding Heights : The Battle for the World Economy by Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw []
  20. China’s PE Industry Grows More Challenging for Foreign Players from Global Intelligence Alliance []
  21. According to a recent estimate, by one measure state employment in China may have decreased 25% between 2002 and 2009.  Although several questions remain unresolved, did the author include listed SOEs (e.g. ICBC) or LLC’s that are subsidiaries that are wholly owned by SOEs?  See A Shrinking Leviathan: State Employment in China Looms Smaller Than Expected from Peterson Institute for International Economics []
  22. It is relatively difficult to gauge the exact number of SOE contribution to GDP in part because numerous suppliers and vendors – while technically private – exclusively do business with SOEs thus further blurring the distinction between private and public.  Another lower estimate is 40% of non-agricultural GDP is generated by SOEs.  For comparison, in 1995 there were 1.4 million SOEs on the mainland.  See China’s New Place in a World in Crisis: Economic, Geopolitical and Environmental Dimensions edited by Ross Garnaut, Ligang Song and Wing Thye Woo, A Glance At Chinese State-Owned Enterprises from CNPolitics and Beijing Lines out Rout for Central SOE Reforms from Caijing []
  23. China government 2011 procurement totals 1.13 trln yuan from Xinhua []
  24. China announces next step in joining Government Procurement Agreement from the World Trade Organization []
  25. Foreign firms in the procurement business also face stiff domestic competition with “buy China” policies at various governmental levels on the mainland.  See Chinese gov’t departments told to “buy China” from Xinhua []
  26. See GDP grows 7.8% to top $8 trillion from China Daily, The state advances from The Economist and China still lags US in trade from China Daily []
  27. In December 2012 it subsequently surged in the highest daily gains since October 2009 due to policy changes in the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor program (QFII合格境外機構投资者).  See China Scraps QFII Limit on Sovereign Funds, Central Banks from Bloomberg, China’s Stocks Drop Below 2,000 from Bloomberg and China stocks fall below 2000 to 4-year low from South China Morning Post []
  28. On the other side of the coin is the view that these stocks are now relatively cheap or a “bargain buy.”  See Analysis: “Caveat emptor” as foreigners rush to ride China rebound from Reuters []
  29. With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility from Peterson Institute for International Economics []
  30. Certification and Accreditation Administration of the People’s Republic of China []
  31. For a step-by-step procedure, see Starting a Business in China from the World Bank.  See also New Path for Trade: Selling in China from The New York Times []
  32. See China gets tough on labelling and packaging of medtech by Katherine Wang and 国家食品药品监督管理局关于规范境外医疗器械标签和包装标识的通知 from the SFDA []
  33. See China Revises Categorization of Imported Goods and Tariff Rates from China Briefing, Import taxes ‘will be cut’ this year from China Daily and China Voice: Keep China’s big spenders at home from Xinhua []
  34. Some airlines such as Air China explain this duty free limit (5,000 yuan) to passengers who are required to declare assets upon landing.  Mainland airports have similar restrictions as well.  See More duty-free shops in Hainan from China Daily and Customs And Visas from Air China []
  35. Free trade zones are clearly the way to go from China Daily []
  36. Shanghai gives green light to duty-free store from China Daily []
  37. As a Chinese colleague recently pointed out, there is a Chinese saying guan zi liang ge kou (官字两个口).  It is literally translated as ‘the character for “official” (guan) has two mouths’ – but actually means ‘there is no such thing as singular truth in officialdom.’  This explains the distinctive trait of the traditional Chinese businessperson’s distaste and disinclination to involve the official court in all matters concerning business dealings.  Hence, the preference, for many centuries, among Chinese business people, has been to first establish a good and dependable relationship with prospective partners prior to the actual transaction and execution of (unofficial) agreements.  The basis of a good relationship is xin yu (信誉) or a strong reputation for honesty and integrity – this is an important virtue called xin (trust) of the classical Confucian gentleman. []
  38. See Cat Scammed: How A U.S. Company Blew Half A Billion Dollars In China from Forbes, Caterpillar Still Investigating Chinese Accounting Discrepancy from Bloomberg, Ex-chairman of firm linked to Caterpillar fraud “dismayed” from Reuters, Caterpillar Tracks a Wayward China Path from The Wall Street Journal and New twist in Caterpillar-ERA saga from Financial Times []
  39. For an overview of common accounting mistakes that have been used in scandals in China be sure to read: The simplicity of Chinese accounting scandals from Quartz []
  40. China is also the largest motorcycle market.  See Global and China Motorcycle Industry Report, 2012 from PRNewswire []
  41. Vehicle sales overtake Europe in 2012 from China Daily and 2012: Slowing growth, maturing market from China Daily []
  42. An estimated 20.65 million automobiles are expected to be sold in 2013.  See China 2013 Auto Sales May Accelerate This Year to Top 20 Million from Bloomberg, China Slowing Auto Sales Still Eclipse U.S.-Japan-Germany: Cars from Bloomberg and China’s vehicle sales remain in doldrums from Financial Times []
  43. One of the issues facing policy makers is traffic congestion.  Each city handles it differently, some auctioning off license plates to residents.  The cost of license plates has increased as cities have become denser and more affluent.  In Shanghai for example, in the recent license plate auction held in January 2013, the average price for a plate was $12,000.  See Shanghai’s Newest Luxury Item: The License Plate from The Wall Street Journal and Shanghai licence plates ‘precious as gold,’ says vice mayor from South China Morning Post []
  44. Used car sales are increasing faster than new car sales on the mainland and may be an opportunity for foreign auto dealers with experience in this segment.  4.8 million used cars were sold in China in 2012 compared with 15.5 million new cars.  Used car sales are expected to double to 10 million in the next three years.  For comparison, in the US the used car market is four times the size of new cars.  See Coming of age: China’s used car market outpaces new sales growth from Reuters []
  45. China to surpass US as top luxury car market: study from Agence France-Presse []
  46. China Vehicle Population Hits 240 Million as Smog Engulfs Cities from Bloomberg []
  47. ‘Imported From Detroit’ Is a Good Idea in China, if Only… from The Wall Street Journal. []
  48. Modern facilities, global reach for Jaguar Land Rover from China Daily []
  49. Many other luxury cars continue to sell well on the mainland.  For example, in 2011 Chinese consumers overtook the US in purchases of Rolls Royce vehicles; although in 2012 US consumers retook the “torch” which may again be handed off in 2013.  See U.S. Overtakes China as World’s No. 1 Buyer of Rolls-Royce from The Wall Street Journal []
  50. According to Flurry, by the end of February 2013, China had 246 million smart devices compared with 230 million in the US.  See iPhone 5 hits China as Apple market share slips from Reuters and China Knocks Off U.S. to Become World’s Top Smart Device Market from Flurry []
  51. See China to pursue renminbi internationalization on market-oriented basis: central bank vice governor from Xinhua, China’s Next Step on Yuan Is Convertibility, Zhou Says from Bloomberg and Full convertibility of the yuan ruled out from China Daily []
  52. In terms of whether the currency is undervalued or overvalued, the only way of knowing for sure what the open market rate “should be” is to float the currency.  By one measure, according to The Economist’s annual Big Mac Index, despite the appreciation over the past several years, the yuan is still “undervalued” by 40%.  See Calories and currencies from The Economist []
  53. Modern China: A tale of luxury villas and displaced villagers from McClatchy []
  54. According to estimates from the World Bank, gross national income per capita in China was $4,940 in 2011. []
  55. Charting China’s Family Value from The Wall Street Journal []
  56. China has 1m multimillionaires: Hurun report from China Daily []
  57. Why Rich Chinese Are Investing Overseas (It’s Not What You Think) from The Wall Street Journal []
  58. Report: China ‘Affluent’ Population to Hit 280 Million by 2020 from The Wall Street Journal []
  59. Red Flags by Matt Garner (forthcoming) []
  60. LinkedIn, others face challenges against China ‘guanxi’ from South China Morning Post []